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AFTERWORD 
 
Concluding Reflections 
on the Legacy of Pierre Bourdieu 
 
Simon Susen 
 
Approaching Pierre Bourdieu 
Those who are unfamiliar, or barely familiar, with the writings of Pierre 
Bourdieu will find a useful and comprehensive introduction to his work in 
the opening chapter, entitled ‘Between Structuralism and Theory of Practice: 
The Cultural Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu’. In it, Hans Joas and Wolfgang 
Knöbl provide us with a clear and accessible overview of some of the main 
philosophical and sociological themes that run through Bourdieu’s writings. 
Joas and Knöbl centre their analysis on  five  interrelated  concepts  that  
play a pivotal role in Bourdieu’s work: the concepts of (1) practice, (2) action, 
(3) the social, (4) cultural sociology, and (5) social science. 
(1) The authors examine Bourdieu’s concept of practice by focusing on one 
of his most influential early works, namely his Outline of a Theory of Practice 
(1977 [1972]). As explained by Joas and Knöbl, Bourdieu’s theory of practice 
is based on a sympathetic but critical revision of Lévi-Strauss’s anthropological 
structuralism through the proposal of an alternative, somewhat refined, form of 
structuralism, commonly described as ‘genetic’ or ‘constructivist’ structuralism. 
According to Joas and Knöbl, the paradigmatic transition from Lévi-Strauss’s 
‘anthropological structuralism’ to Bourdieu’s ‘genetic structuralism’ contains 
a number of significant presuppositional shifts. (i) The shift from ‘rule following’ 
to ‘rule breaking’ is motivated by the insight that social actors do not always 
follow the rules imposed upon them by their social environment: the relative 
unpredictability of society is due to the ineluctable power of human agency. 
(ii) The shift from ‘structure’ to ‘action’ is justified considering the fact that social 
structures cannot exist without social action: the very possibility of society is 
contingent upon the constant interplay between social structure and social 
action. (iii) The shift from ‘theory’ to ‘practice’ is imperative to avoid falling into the 
  
 
scholastic fallacy of treating ‘the things of logic’ as ‘the logic of things’ and 
thereby passing off ‘the reality of the model’ as ‘the model of reality’: a truly 
reflexive sociology, in the Bourdieusian sense, needs to recognise that human 
life is to be conceived of as an ensemble of social practices. (iv) The shift from 
‘substantialism’ to ‘relationalism’ is based on the conviction that we need to replace 
the substantialist with the relationalist mode of thought in order to account for 
the fact that social fields are defined by contingent relations between, rather 
than by universal properties of, social actors: society is a relationally constructed 
reality. (v) The shift from ‘logocentric dichotomism’ to ‘homological holism’ permits us to 
transcend the counterproductive antinomy between objectivist and subjectivist 
approaches to the social: society emanates from the homological interplay 
between field-divided objectivities and habitus-specific subjectivities. Thus, 
from a Bourdieusian perspective, social practices are possible only through the 
homological interplay between positionally structured realms of objectivity 
and dispositionally constituted forms of subjectivity. 
(2) Joas and Knöbl begin their examination of Bourdieu’s concept of action 
by pointing out that the Bourdieusian model of human action differs from 
‘utilitarian’ or ‘economic’ models in three respects: first, it conceives of human 
action in relationalist, rather than rationalist, terms; second, it studies human 
action in contextualist, rather than universalist, terms; and, third, it examines 
human action in praxeological, rather than transcendental, terms. If human 
action is always relationally, contextually, and praxeologically constituted, it 
cannot be reduced to the outcome of a largely self-sufficient, predominantly 
calculative, and merely cognitive subject. The habitus constitutes a 
dispositionally structured apparatus of perception, appreciation, and action. Its 
main function is to allow social actors to confront the field-specific 
imperatives thrown at them in a field-divided world. The social field denotes a 
positionally structured realm of socialisation, interaction, and competition. 
Its main function is to provide social actors with a practically defined 
framework in which to mobilise their habitus-specific resources in relation to a 
habitus-divided world. Different forms of capital describe different – 
objectively externalised and subjectively internalised – sources of material 
and symbolic power. The main function of (different types of) capital is to 
enable social actors to compete over material and symbolic resources in 
relationally constituted realms. A general theory of the economy of practices 
needs to account for the fact that the homological interplay between habitus-
specific forms of subjectivity and field-differentiated forms of objectivity lies 
at the heart of the struggle over capital-based resources available in a given 
society. 
(3) The two authors continue by reflecting upon Bourdieu’s concept of the 
social. As they point out, field, habitus, and capital constitute the three conceptual 
cornerstones  of  the  Bourdieusian architecture of the social. Yet, rather than 
  
 
conceiving of these categories in isolation from each other, Bourdieusian 
analysis is concerned with exploring the various and often contradictory ways 
in which they are empirically interconnected. From a Bourdieusian perspective, 
the field can be regarded as the ontological foundation of the social: to be 
situated in different realms of social reality means to be embedded in different 
social fields. Social fields constitute the espaces des possibles, that is, the delimited 
and delimiting spaces of possibilities in which human actions take place. As 
Joas and Knöbl explain, Bourdieusian field theory and Luhmannian systems 
theory converge and diverge in three fundamental respects. They converge in 
emphasising that social fields – in the Bourdieusian sense – and social systems – 
in the Luhmannian sense – are characterised by their (i) constraining ubiquity, 
(ii) functional differentiality, and (iii) relative autonomy. Paradoxically, the two 
accounts also diverge in precisely these respects. (i) According to Bourdieu, 
the constraining ubiquity of social fields can be challenged through the 
generative power of social struggle and human agency. By contrast, according 
to Luhmann, there is little – if any – room for transformative malleability 
within social realms whose normative horizons are defined by systemic 
boundaries. (ii) From a Bourdieusian perspective, the functional differentiality 
of social fields is limited to the degree of evolutionary determinacy of a given 
society. Conversely, from a Luhmannian perspective, any kind of society has, 
in principle, the capacity to develop an infinite number of systemic realms that 
generate a potentially unlimited amount of spaces of delimited interactionality. 
(iii) Following Bourdieu, the relative autonomy of social fields is always subject 
to the hegemonic imperatives of a given type of society. Following Luhmann, 
social systems can, in principle, reproduce themselves without being dictated 
by the overarching imperatives of a dominant form of normativity. 
(4) Joas and Knöbl provide us with useful insights into some of the key 
aspects of Bourdieu’s notion of cultural sociology. Far from regarding culture 
as a neutral and disinterested affair, Bourdieu conceives of it as a vehicle of 
social distinction. Given the foundational status of our daily immersion in 
culture, the attainment of cultural capital is a precondition for the acquisition 
of other forms of capital. In other words, we obtain social, economic, political, 
linguistic, and educational forms of capital on condition that we have access 
to cultural capital. Ordinary actors can participate in social life only insofar 
as they are exposed to cultural fields, develop a cultural habitus, and acquire 
cultural capital. Since the human species is a socio-constructive species, the 
emergence of society is inconceivable without the creation of culture. In order 
to develop a cultural habitus and participate in a cultural field, we need to 
incorporate cultural capital. Culture is inevitably interest-laden because we can 
develop an interest in the world only if we develop an interest in culture, and 
culture is necessarily power-laden because access to culture is a precondition 
  
 
for access to power. Symbolic power derives from people’s generative capacity 
to convert the need for self-realisation into an endogenously mobilised resource 
of exogenously approved consecration. 
(5) The authors conclude their chapter by reflecting on Bourdieu’s remarkable 
influence on contemporary social science. They observe that Bourdieu’s 
influence is particularly palpable in the Francophone, Germanophone, and 
Anglophone fields of social and political thought. (i) Probably more than in 
any other national tradition of sociology, the contemporary French academic 
field of sociology appears to be divided between ‘the Bourdieusians’ and 
‘the Boltanskians’; whereas the former are associated with the paradigm     
of sociologie critique, the latter are referred to as advocates of an alternative 
agenda commonly described as sociologie de la critique or, more recently, sociologie 
pragmatique de la critique. Bourdieusians tend to regard social science as a tool to 
uncover the underlying mechanisms that shape the hierarchical structuration 
of society. By contrast, Boltanskians tend to conceive of social science as a 
tool to make sense of the various disputes generated by ordinary actors when 
engaging in the discursive problematisation of society. (ii) In the contemporary 
German academic field of sociology, Bourdieusian conceptual frameworks are 
increasingly popular in empirical studies on life-style. This tendency reflects 
the sociological significance of actors’ dependence on access to multiple 
forms of capital in differentiated societies: in order to enjoy the status of an 
empowered member of society we have no choice but to develop the capacity 
to acquire and mobilise capital-based resources that permit our subjectivity 
to relate to and act upon increasingly differentiated realms of objectivity. (iii) 
Despite the persisting paradigmatic predominance of economic and utilitarian 
approaches in the contemporary North American academic field of sociology, 
it appears to be more and more common to establish an elastic comfort zone 
between the utilitarian paradigm of ‘rational action’ in the market place and 
the relational paradigm of ‘interest-laden action’ in the social field. Social life, 
then, is driven by a permanent struggle over resources: cultural resources, 
economic resources, linguistic resources, educational resources, political 
resources, and symbolic resources. In short, the history of all hitherto existing 
society is the history of struggles over social resources. Ultimately, to have 
access to a legitimate habitus via the acquisition of legitimate capital and 
participation in a legitimate field means to have access to a legitimate life. 
 
Bourdieu and Marx (I) 
In the second chapter, entitled ‘Pierre Bourdieu: Unorthodox Marxist?’, 
Bridget Fowler defends the view that Bourdieu can be regarded as one of the 
great heirs of the Western Marxist tradition. Although she does not suggest that 
  
 
Marx was the only classical sociologist whose oeuvre significantly influenced 
Bourdieu’s writings, Fowler argues that Marx had a distinctive impact on 
Bourdieu and that the significance of this influence is often downplayed when 
examining Bourdieusian concepts such as field, habitus, and doxa. More 
specifically, she claims that Bourdieu’s syntheses, which possess a masterly 
originality derived from a variety of intellectual traditions, were aimed at 
strengthening, rather than at undermining, Marx’s historical materialism. 
Bourdieu neither abandoned nor repudiated  Marx’s  materialist  method,  
but rather converted it into a sociologically more complex and analytically 
more sophisticated approach, insisting upon the central importance of the 
ineluctable links between the material and the symbolic, the economic and the 
cultural, and the objective and the normative dimensions of social life. 
Given his emphasis on the multidimensional constitution of human 
reality, it comes as no surprise that Bourdieu was strongly opposed to all 
forms of Vulgärmarxismus, which – as Fowler points out – fall into the traps of 
‘false radicalism’ and ‘mechanical materialism’. We are therefore confronted 
with a curious paradox: Bourdieu provides his most powerful critique of 
orthodox Marxism by adopting and developing Marx’s own conceptual and 
methodological tools. He draws upon insights from Marxist thought whilst 
seeking to overcome some of its most significant shortcomings. In so doing, 
Bourdieu is firmly situated in the self-critical spirit of the Marxist project: 
just as ‘it is essential to educate the educator himself ’ or herself, it is crucial 
to criticise the critic himself or herself (Marx, 2000/1977 [1845]: 172); and 
just as it is imperative to sociologise sociology itself, it is indispensable to 
reflect upon the process of reflection itself (Bourdieu, 1976: 104; 2001: 16, 
19, and 220). 
What, then, allows us to assume that Bourdieusian forms of reflection 
stand in the tradition of Marxist social analysis? To what extent can Bourdieu 
be regarded as one of the great inheritors of the Western Marxist tradition? 
As Fowler demonstrates on the basis of a close textual analysis, Marxian 
thought is an omnipresent feature in key areas of Bourdieu’s writings. In 
order to illustrate this, the author focuses on six Bourdieusian themes: Algeria; 
education and class; the cultural field; struggles within the academic field; the 
problem of agency; and, finally, the idea of a general theory of cultural power. 
As Fowler outlines in the introductory part of her chapter, we can identify a 
number of theoretical concerns that feature centrally both in Marxian and in 
Bourdieusian social analysis. These overlapping theoretical concerns, which 
are instances of Bourdieu’s debt to Marx, can be synthesised as follows. 
(1) Relationality: The most obvious point of convergence between Marx 
and Bourdieu can be found in their shared conviction that human reality is 
the ensemble of social relations. From a sociological perspective, social life 
  
 
is to be conceived of not in terms of transcendental essences or ahistorical 
abstractions, but in terms of spatiotemporally contingent relations between 
different people and between different groups of people. 
(2) Practice: A further important meeting point between Marx and 
Bourdieu is the assumption that social life is essentially practical. Marx’s 
historical materialism and Bourdieu’s genetic structuralism constitute two 
macro- theoretical frameworks that are based on the presupposition that both 
the constitution and the evolution of society are shaped by the unfolding of 
interrelated social practices. 
(3) Capital: Yet another shared concern in the works of Marx and Bourdieu 
is their critical engagement with the fact that, in stratified societies, access to 
social resources depends on access to capital. Bourdieu’s differentiation between 
various forms of capital – such as economic, cultural, social, linguistic, and 
symbolic capital – does justice to the complexity of polycentrically organised 
realities in which social resources are not only asymmetrically distributed but 
also positionally externalised and dispositionally internalised. 
(4) Power: In light of the fact that our ability to act upon the world is 
contingent upon our hierarchically defined position in the social space,  
Marx and Bourdieu aim to demonstrate that asymmetrically structured  
social relations are interest-laden power relations. Before we can imagine the 
possibility of a classless reality, we need to face up to the complexities arising 
from the structural divisions that permeate every class-ridden society. 
(5) Economic and Symbolic Power: Both Marx and Bourdieu are holistic thinkers 
in that they stress the inseparability of the material and the cultural, the 
economic and the symbolic, and the objective and the normative dimensions of 
social life. Bourdieu’s attempt to shift the emphasis from the study of economic 
power, which is central to early modern forms of orthodox Marxism, to the 
study of symbolic power, which is a key component of late modern versions of 
cultural Marxism, reflects the need to account for the sociological significance 
of people’s capacity to acquire social power through both material and cultural 
resources. What is present in class is the power of social classification; what is 
present in culture is the power of social representation. Power-laden divisions 
in the world manifest themselves in interest-laden visions of the world. 
(6) Contradiction and Crisis:   In  both  Marx’s and Bourdieu’s writings, 
contradiction and crisis are considered as  indivisible  aspects  of  the  social 
world. Regardless of whether  –  following  Marx  –  we  focus  on the  
contradiction  between  the  forces  of  production  and  the  relations  of 
production, or – following Bourdieu – we examine the contradiction 
between the orthodox discourses of dominant groups and the heterodox 
discourses of dominated groups, we cannot make sense of material and 
symbolic revolutions without  recognising that structural and ideological 
  
 
contradictions, which can lead to small-scale and large-scale social crises, 
are major driving forces of historical development. 
(7) Anti-Idealism: As critical thinkers who are committed to the empirical 
investigation of social reality, both Marx and Bourdieu are deeply suspicious 
of philosophical idealism. The presuppositions underlying Marx’s critique  
of German idealism are omnipresent in Bourdieu’s critique of European 
idealism: Kant’s transcendental account of reason and taste; Derrida’s merely 
philosophical, and hence ultimately scholastic, attack on logocentrism; 
Foucault’s obsession with free-floating épistèmes; Habermas’s romantic belief 
in the socio-ontological preponderance of communicative action in the 
lifeworld; or Austin’s meticulous study of language, which overestimates  
the power of words and underestimates the power of social roles. All of 
these philosophical projects are illustrative of scholastic attempts to study 
cognitive, discursive, or linguistic forces of human reality regardless of their 
socio-historical determinacy. 
(8) Science: Just as Marx rejects a facile utopianism in the name of 
science, Bourdieu has little patience with postmodern relativism, insisting 
that a genuinely sociological study of human reality requires a scientific 
analysis of social relationality. From this perspective, neither ideal worlds,  
in which ‘anything is possible’, nor rainbow worlds, in which ‘anything 
goes’, contribute much – if anything – to the scientific world, in which 
‘everything is to be questioned’. Neither the Idealpolitik of utopian reason 
nor the Provokationspolitik of cynical reason can play a constructive role in the 
Realpolitik of scientific reason. 
(9) Theory and Practice: For both Marx and Bourdieu, theorising for the sake 
of theorising can only lead to self-sufficient and pointless forms of knowledge 
production. Marx regards theory as an instrument that can become a material 
force when absorbed and mobilised by the masses, and Bourdieu considers 
sociology as a normative tool that can and should be used not only to 
undermine the disempowering effects of social domination but also to realise 
the empowering potentials of social emancipation. 
 
Bourdieu and Marx (II) 
The third chapter, ‘From Marx to Bourdieu: The Limits of the Structuralism 
of Practice’, was originally written in French by Bruno Karsenti and was 
translated into English by Simon Susen. It ties in with Bridget Fowler’s 
conviction that the impact of Marx’s historical materialism on Bourdieu’s 
genetic structuralism cannot be overestimated. As the chapter’s title suggests, 
Marxian thought can be regarded as an integral element of the Bourdieusian 
project. Thus, in order to make sense of the presuppositional underpinnings 
  
 
of the latter, we need to remind ourselves of the philosophical premises of 
the former. In relation to Bourdieu, the socio-ontological significance of these 
philosophical premises manifests itself in three of Marx’s key concerns: first, 
in his concern with anthropological distinctiveness, which is rooted in humans’ 
capacity to produce their own – materially constituted and symbolically 
mediated – means of subsistence; second, in his concern with anthropological 
contradictions, particularly those derived from the structural division between 
producers and non-producers; and, third, in his concern with anthropological 
development, which is inconceivable without the gradual differentiation between 
material labour and intellectual labour. Inspired by Marx’s oeuvre, the whole 
point of Bourdieu’s project is to replace the ‘game of theory’ with the ‘reality 
of practice’. In the ‘game of theory’, the act of  critical reflection is treated  
as independent of, and removed from, the empirical constitution of human 
life. By contrast, in the ‘reality of practice’, the act of critical reflection is 
experienced as both dependent upon and embedded within the relational 
production of social existence. 
With the relational production of cultural life forms in mind, Karsenti 
provides a detailed analysis, on a number of levels, of the cornerstones of 
Bourdieu’s structuralism of practice. Three levels of comparison between 
Marx and Bourdieu are particularly important. First, just as Marx insists upon 
the interwovenness of the material and the symbolic dimensions of social life, 
Bourdieu invites us to overcome the – arguably artificial and, in some respects, 
counterproductive – antinomy between objectivist and subjectivist approaches 
in the social sciences. Second, just as from a Marxian perspective the point  
is not only to interpret but also to transform the world, from a Bourdieusian 
perspective we need to move from the ‘logic of theory’ to the ‘logic of practice’ 
in order to account for our ineluctable situatedness within, rather than our 
imaginary detachment from, the world. And, third, just as in Marx we can 
find an unambiguous attempt to conceive of human consciousness in terms 
of social determinacy derived from the physical organisation of the world,  
in Bourdieu we are confronted with the task of shifting from the imaginary 
of cognitive detachment, celebrated in scholastic forms of  philosophy,  to  
the reality of bodily engagement, explored in reflexive forms of sociology. 
Hence, socio-analysis – as advocated by Bourdieu – is a form of sociological 
psychoanalysis, compelling us to comprehend the biographical condition of 
human individuality in relation to the historical condition of human society: 
every time we seek to throw ourselves at society by virtue of individual agency, 
society has already thrown itself at us by virtue of its relational determinacy. 
In fact, the ‘belatedness’ of the human condition explains the ‘taken-for- 
grantedness’ of human practices: our physical immersion in reality necessarily 
precedes our material and symbolic actions upon society. 
  
 
Crucial to the paradigmatic shift from the scholastic illusion of ‘cognitive 
detachment’ to the critical reflection upon ‘bodily engagement’ is a normative 
issue: if we recognise that, as bodily beings, we are not only exposed to but also 
immersed in the structural contradictions of society, then we need to accept 
that the material and symbolic divisions by which we are surrounded are 
sources of separation between people that exist as classificatory schemes within 
people. Put differently, positional separations, which divide the social universe 
into competing groups and fields, manifest themselves in dispositional schemes 
of perception and appreciation, which impose themselves as quasi-naturalised 
resources upon all historically mediated forms of human action. To the extent 
that the positional divisions that exist in our society permeate the dispositional 
schemes that exist in our bodies, the structural contradictions that pervade 
the normative world have  the power to colonise the corporeal apparatus   
that underlies our subjective world. There is no such thing as an innocent 
subject, for our inevitable immersion in the world compels us to internalise 
the contradictions of the world. Before we can create subversive forms of 
reflexivity and invent transformative modes of agency,  we need to face up  
to the predominance of our bodily constituted complicity with established 
patterns of ideological and behavioural normativity. 
 
Bourdieu and Durkheim 
In the fourth chapter, ‘Durkheim and Bourdieu: The Common Plinth and its 
Cracks’, written in French by Loïc Wacquant and translated into English by 
Tarik Wareh, we move from Marx to another key figure in classical sociology 
whose writings have had an enormous impact on Bourdieu’s work: Émile 
Durkheim. Rather than providing a sterile comparison between Durkheim 
and Bourdieu, and far from suggesting that Bourdieusian sociology represents 
a  merely  Durkheimian  endeavour,  Wacquant,   whilst   acknowledging   
the eclectic underpinnings of Bourdieu’s work, offers a systematic and 
intellectually challenging account of four presuppositional pillars upon 
which both Durkheimian and Bourdieusian sociology are based. These four 
pillars, which according to Wacquant are omnipresent in the works of both 
Durkheim and Bourdieu, can be described as follows: (1) the attachment to 
rationalism, which manifests itself in the conviction that scientific knowledge 
can provide us with the conceptual and methodological tools that allow for a 
critical analysis of the social world; (2) the defence of the undividedness of social 
science, which is expressed in the categorical refusal of theoreticism; (3) the 
commitment to recognising the intimate link between sociology and historiography, 
which is articulated in the study of the socio-historical constitution of human 
existence; and (4) the recourse to ethnology as a privileged device for ‘indirect 
  
experimentation’, which is motivated by the idea that ethnological analysis 
can serve as a legitimate experimental technique of sociological investigation. 
As stated above, Wacquant argues that the aforementioned concerns 
represent four normative pillars in the writings of both Durkheim and 
Bourdieu, particularly with regard to their respective conceptions of 
knowledge. According to both thinkers, sociological knowledge is by 
definition rationally motivated, scientifically oriented, historically 
informed, and ethnologically sensitive. Nevertheless, as Wacquant 
demonstrates, their epistemological frameworks not only converge but also 
diverge at various points. 
(1) Both Durkheim and Bourdieu insist upon the epistemological gap between 
ordinary and scientific knowledge. Yet, whereas Durkheim seeks to free sociology 
from all presuppositional knowledge based on common sense, Bourdieu aims 
to construct an enlarged conception of the social, capable of accounting for 
the fact that insofar as the very possibility of society rests upon the homological 
interplay between field and habitus, the construction of a critical sociology 
depends on its capacity to explore the functional interplay between scientific 
types of reflexivity and ordinary forms of knowledgeability. 
(2) Both thinkers highlight the normative potentials of social science, which are 
epitomised in a threefold refusal: (i) the refusal of worldly seductions, (ii) the 
refusal of confinement within the scholarly microcosm, and (iii) the refusal 
of disciplinary fragmentation and theoreticism. Paradoxically, however, the 
two scholars are both united and divided by this tripartite concern. (i) For 
Durkheim, the scientificity of sociology emanates from its purposive capacity 
to be guided by the rational search for objectivity. For Bourdieu, on the other 
hand, the scientificity of sociology derives from its contemplative capacity to 
embrace a self-critical position of reflexivity. (ii) Whereas Durkheim stresses 
the impersonal, and thus allegedly disinterested, constitution of scientific 
knowledge, Bourdieu emphasises the relational, and hence ultimately interest- 
laden, constitution of scientific knowledge. (iii) Durkheim opposes the scholastic 
celebration of theoreticism by reminding us of the objective prevalence of 
social facts. Bourdieu, by contrast, seeks to move from the ‘logic of theory’ to 
the ‘logic of practice’ by pointing at the powerful mystery of social acts. 
(3) According to both Durkheim and Bourdieu, it is the task of social 
scientists to uncover the historical constitution of the human condition. The 
spatiotemporal contingency of the human condition can be illustrated on the 
basis of three forms of historicisation:  (i) the historicisation of human agency, 
(ii) the historicisation of human society, and (iii) the historicisation of human 
knowledgeability. Yet, again – and again somewhat paradoxically – the two 
thinkers are not only united but also divided by this tripartite concern. (i) From 
a Durkheimian perspective, the creative power of human agency tends to be 
superseded by the constraining power of social factuality. From a Bourdieusian 
  
 
perspective, however, the omnipresence of social factuality can be challenged 
by the unfolding of human agency. (ii) According to Durkheimian parameters, 
the preponderance of objectivity over subjectivity pervades the functional 
determinacy of every society. According to Bourdieusian parameters, it is  
the homology between positionally structured realms of objectivity and 
dispositionally constituted forms of subjectivity which permeates the relational 
determinacy of every society. (iii) In the Durkheimian universe, the validity of 
scientific knowledge hinges upon its objective capacity to rise above its own 
historicity. In the Bourdieusian universe, the validity of scientific knowledge 
rests upon its reflexive capacity to face up to its own historicity. 
(4) Both Durkheim and Bourdieu favour a posteriori over a priori knowledge in 
that they are committed to the ethnological, rather than the logocentric, study 
of the social world; and both prefer a fortiori over arbitrary knowledge in that 
they are committed to scientific, rather than speculative, forms of reasoning. 
Yet, their respective conceptions of ethnologically informed validity also differ 
substantially from each other: whereas for Durkheim social-scientific research 
is oriented towards the discovery of irrefutable generalities that underlie the 
functioning of society, for Bourdieu social-scientific research cannot dispense 
with categorical openness to the potential refutability of all explanatory 
categories. In light of the above reflections we are obliged to recognise that, 
as Wacquant indicates in the title of his chapter, the common plinth beneath 
Durkheim and Bourdieu has significant cracks. 
 
Bourdieu and Weber 
Bourdieu was interviewed on several occasions in his career, and by now most 
of these interviews have been published and translated into English. The  
fifth chapter contains one that has not been previously translated into, let 
alone published in, English. This interview, conducted by Franz Schultheis 
and Andreas Pfeuffer, was published in German (see Bourdieu, 2000) one 
year after it took place in a café on Boulevard Saint-Germain in Paris in the 
spring of 1999. The interview was originally conducted in French, and we 
are grateful to Stephan Egger, the translator of the German publication, for 
providing us with both the original (French) audio version and the published 
(German) translation. 
The title of this chapter anticipates the thematic focus of the interview: 
‘With Weber Against Weber: In Conversation With Pierre Bourdieu’. It is 
commonly accepted that some of the key elements of Marxian, Durkheimian, 
Weberian, and – to some extent – Simmelian sociology can be considered 
cornerstones of Bourdieusian thought. It is often suggested, however, that there 
is an imbalance between these ‘classical’ approaches in terms of their respective 
  
 
influence on the development of Bourdieu’s oeuvre. More specifically, there 
is a pronounced tendency in the literature to presume or, in some cases, to 
demonstrate that both Marxian and Durkheimian sociology had a particularly 
strong impact on Bourdieu’s work (see, for example, chapters 2, 3, and 4 in this 
volume). Yet, in comparison to the previous two influences, the impact that 
Weberian sociology had on Bourdieu remains not only widely underestimated 
but also to a significant extent underexplored. 
This interview, hitherto largely unknown in the Anglophone world of 
social science, permits and indeed compels us to challenge the notion that 
Marx and Durkheim can be regarded as the ‘primary’ classical influences   
on Bourdieu’s work, and that consequently Weber plays a somewhat 
‘secondary’ role in his oeuvre. The elaborate responses given by Bourdieu  
in this interview illustrate not only that he had a far-reaching appreciation   
of Weber’s writings, but also that Weberian sociology can be considered a 
pierre angulaire of the entire edifice of Bourdieusian thought. The interview 
covers a wide range of topics and touches upon issues related to some of 
Bourdieu’s deepest concerns and convictions. The key assertions made in 
the interview shall be summarised here, somewhat provocatively, in Eleven 
Theses on Bourdieu: 
 
1. The chief defect of most hitherto existing forms of materialism in France (that of 
Althusser included) is the disregard of Weber. Weber was not taken seriously 
by French Marxists because he was largely perceived as a conservative 
defender of ‘methodological individualism’ and ‘bourgeois philosophy’. 
2. The question whether objective truth can be attributed to scientific thinking is not a 
question of theory but is a practical question. Bourdieu makes this point clear 
when affirming that ‘[a]t the end of the day, the important thing is the 
research itself, that is, the research on the subject matter itself ’ (Bourdieu 
et al., 2011 [2000]: 117). In order to embark upon the study of society we 
need to engage with the reality of human practices. 
3. The orthodox materialist doctrine concerning changing circumstances and upbringing 
forgets that circumstances are changed through both material and symbolic struggles 
over the monopoly of legitimate power over worldly and sacred goods and that if, in 
principle, nothing ‘must remain as it was’ (Bourdieu et al., 2011 [2000]: 121, 
italics added), it is essential to socialise and resocialise the socialisers themselves. If 
we can find one categorical imperative in Bourdieusian thought it is the 
notion that social arrangements are relatively arbitrary. Social reality ‘does 
not have to be – that is, it is not necessarily – like this or like that’ (Bourdieu 
et al., 2011 [2000]: 121, italics in original). From Bourdieu’s constructivist 
perspective, ‘great philosophical revolutions’ cannot be dissociated  
from ‘great social revolutions’ (Bourdieu et al., 2011 [2000]: 120). The 
‘coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity’ 
  
 
(Marx, 2000/1977 [1845]: 172) indicates that social actors cannot escape 
the homology between objectivity and subjectivity. They cannot step out 
of the socio-ontological interdependence between field-specific positions 
and habitus-specific dispositions. The homological interplay between 
objectivity and subjectivity underlies the construction of spatiotemporally 
specific arrangements in every society. 
4. Weber starts from the fact of the religious permeation of the world, of the duplication of 
the world into a religious world and a secular one. Given that, throughout history, 
the constitution of society appears to be characterised by the intimate 
intertwinement of religious and secular modes of relating to and making 
sense of the world, a comprehensive social science needs to develop both 
a ‘political economy of religion’ and a ‘critical anthropology of religion’. 
The former does justice to the fact that ‘the symbolic’ and ‘the material’ 
are two interdependent dimensions of the social world; the latter accounts 
for the fact that, in the long run, the social world can only survive as    
an enchanted – or at least quasi-enchanted – world. It is the meaning- 
donating function of religion which explains its pervasive power to deal 
with existential questions. As long as existential dilemmas are part of 
the human condition, religious – or at least quasi-religious – beliefs and 
practices will be an integral part of social life. 
5. Orthodox Marxists, not satisfied with abstract thinking, want concrete action; but they do 
not conceive of either abstract thinking or concrete action as field-specific and habitus- 
dependent practices. Given the polycentric nature of complex societies, we 
need to recognise that different ways of making sense of and acting 
upon the world are positionally defined ways of being immersed in and 
dispositionally constituted ways of relating to the world. Polycentric social 
settings require centreless social theories. 
6. Every human being is situated in and constituted by an ensemble of social relations. 
In order to understand both the positional and the dispositional 
determinacy of human actors, we need to capture the relations between 
them, for it is the contingent relations between, rather than the universal 
properties of, social actors which determine how they are situated in and 
relate to the world. 
7. If the ‘religious sentiment’ is itself a social product and if every religion emerges under 
particular social conditions, then it must be the task of a critical sociology of religion to 
shed light on both the material and the symbolic mechanisms that contribute to either the 
reproduction or the transformation of religious fields. Religious fields, however, are 
to be conceived of not only as relations of feelings and meanings, but also 
as relations of power: a ‘political economy of religion’ needs to shed light 
on ‘the stakes in the struggles over the monopoly of the legitimate power 
over the sacred goods’ (Bourdieu et al., 2011 [2000]: 119 , italics removed) 
in order to understand that the power-laden nature of material relations 
  
 
is impregnated with the interest-laden nature of symbolic relations, and 
vice versa. 
8. To recognise that all social life is essentially practical and that all human practices are 
essentially social means to acknowledge that society is practically lived. It is because 
people have to live with one another that they encounter one another, and 
it is because they are situated in the world that they are invested in it. 
9. The highest point of orthodox materialism – that is, of materialism that does not 
comprehend the multilayered complexity of practical activity – is the reduction of 
sociorelational realities to socioeconomic ontologies. Yet, the material and the 
symbolic are two irreducible components of the social world. There has never 
been a society whose mode of production could have been disentangled 
from its mode of signification, since all coexistentially established human 
arrangements are composed of materially constituted and symbolically 
mediated social relations. 
10. The standpoint of dogmatic philosophy is scholastic purism; the standpoint of 
critical sociology is reflexive eclecticism. To engage in the critical exercise of 
reflexive eclecticism requires resisting the temptation of relying on 
intellectual inward-lookingness and thereby embarking upon a journey of 
transdisciplinary outward-lookingness. No tradition can possibly emerge 
without drawing on previously existing traditions. The success of a 
critical sociology depends on its capacity to overcome counterproductive 
boundaries between artificially divided epistemologies. 
11. Social actors reproduce the world in various ways; the point is to recognise their capacity 
to transform it. Just as one cannot be situated in the world without perceiving 
the pervasive power of social constraints, ‘one cannot make any progress 
without a respectful sense of freedom’ (Bourdieu et al., 2011 [2000]: 117). 
 
Bourdieu and Nietzsche 
In the sixth chapter, ‘Bourdieu and Nietzsche: Taste as a Struggle’, Keijo 
Rahkonen offers an insightful comparison between Bourdieusian and 
Nietzschean thought, which fills a significant gap in the literature. Rahkonen’s 
analysis is divided into five sections. 
In the first section, Rahkonen examines Bourdieu’s conception of taste. It is 
worth mentioning that Bourdieu was one of the first thinkers to provide a 
sociological account of taste. Although influential scholars such as Max Weber, 
Georg Simmel, Thorstein Veblen, and Norbert Elias clearly touched upon  
the concept of taste in their writings, none of them systematically explored 
its sociological significance. Hence, as Rahkonen – borrowing an expression 
from Loïc Wacquant – points out, Bourdieu’s sociological account of taste, 
an elaborate version of which can be found in Distinction, can be described 
  
 
as a ‘Copernican revolution in the study of taste’. Several philosophical 
accounts of taste – particularly those associated with Kantian thought – are 
based on the assumption that the nature of  taste is transcendentally, and  
thus transhistorically, determined. By contrast, most sociological accounts  
of taste – notably those associated with Bourdieusian thought – put forward 
the idea that the constitution of taste is socially, and hence spatiotemporally, 
determined. Bourdieu differentiates between three different ‘universes of taste’: 
the realm of ‘pure taste’, oriented towards the consumption of ‘highbrow 
culture’ and mainly acquired by members of the dominant classes; the realm 
of ‘average taste’, directed towards the consumption of ‘middlebrow culture’ 
and particularly common amongst members of the middle classes; and the 
realm of ‘popular taste’, aimed at the consumption of ‘lowbrow culture’ and 
spread amongst members of the lower classes. In other words, the realm of 
human taste is impregnated with the relationally defined interplay between 
positionally structured forms of objectivity and dispositionally structured forms 
of subjectivity, which underlies the functioning of every stratified society. 
In the second section,  Rahkonen examines Bourdieu’s  critique of Kant’s 
conception of taste. The Bourdieusian sociology of taste represents a radical 
critique of the Kantian philosophy of taste. From a Bourdieusian perspective, 
Kant’s three famous critiques – the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical 
Reason,  and  the  Critique  of   Judgement  –  are  deeply  flawed  for  failing  to  take 
into consideration the social conditioning of reason and judgement. Kant’s 
scholastic quest for aesthetic transcendentality disregards the ineluctable 
predominance of social relationality in the cultural construction of reality. If 
there is anything transcendental about the realm of aesthetics it is the fact that 
the transcendental itself is socially constituted. Rather than speculating about 
the analytical purity of theoretical reason, the moral universality of practical 
reason, or the transcendental lawfulness of aesthetic judgement, we need to 
examine the social determinacy of subjectivity in order to understand why our 
perception and appreciation of reality cannot escape the omnipresent power 
of human relationality. An interest-laden society generates interest-driven 
actors. How we perceive, appreciate, and act upon the world depends on how 
we are situated in the world in relation to others. Hence, taste is a matter not 
of disembodied or transhistorical subjectivity but of social determinacy. 
In the third section, Rahkonen explores Bourdieu’s conceptions of taste and 
‘ressentiment’ in relation to power. From a Bourdieusian perspective, struggles 
over taste are struggles over power. If there is one truth about taste, it is that 
both its constitution and its meaning are constantly at stake in society. If taste 
is so powerful because it makes us perceive, appreciate, and act upon the 
world in particular ways, then neither access to nor cultivation of a particular 
taste can be dissociated from inclusion in or exclusion from symbolically 
  
 
mediated forms of social power. If we accept that no worldly situated subject 
can possibly escape the endogenous power of an exogenously determined 
apparatus of perception, appreciation, and action, then the classificatory 
schemes acquired by habitus-specific dispositions cannot be divorced from 
social struggles over field-specific positions. Given the interest-laden nature 
of our immersion in the social world, a truly reflexive sociology needs to be 
critical of itself: of its own schemes of classification, of its own programmes 
of perception, of its own agendas of appreciation; in short, as Rahkonen  
puts it, of its own ‘ressentiments’. 
The concern with the nature of ‘ressentiment’ leads Rahkonen, in the fourth 
section, to reflect upon Nietzsche’s conception of taste. However one interprets the 
role of the concept of taste in Nietzsche’s writings, there is little doubt that, 
from a Nietzschean perspective, not only ‘power’ and ‘truth’ but also ‘power’ 
and ‘taste’ are intimately interrelated: just as ‘the will to power’ cannot be 
disentangled from ‘the will to truth’, ‘the will to power’ cannot be dissociated 
from ‘the will to taste’. What we consider to be either right or wrong is often 
what we like to be either right or wrong. The categorising powerfulness of taste 
is intertwined with the stratifying tastelessness of power. In Nietzsche’s Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra we are reminded that ‘all life is dispute over taste and tasting’. 
For, as we may add, ‘all taste is dispute over life and living’. 
And this is where, in the final section of Rahkonen’s chapter, Bourdieu 
enters the stage again – this time together with Nietzsche. What, then, can we 
learn from bringing Nietzsche and Bourdieu closer together? Following Rahkonen, one 
of the most obvious features they have in common is their anti-Kantianism: 
both are opposed to Kant’s arguably sterile and disembodied account of the 
subject in general and of taste in particular. To be precise, Nietzsche and 
Bourdieu share six anti-Kantian assumptions. First, taste is interest-laden: the 
symbolic differentiation between legitimate and illegitimate forms of taste 
emanates from the structural differentiation between dominant and dominated 
social groups, whose taken-for-grantedness of habitus-specific dispositions is 
permeated by the interest-ladenness of field-specific positions. Second, taste is 
perspective-laden: our perception of the world is contingent upon our position in 
the world. Third, taste is context-laden: before we can make sense of the world, 
we have to be situated in the world; and before we can develop a taste for the 
world, the world has to shape our taste. Fourth, taste is culture-laden: human 
subjectivity cannot escape the spatiotemporal determinacy of the intrinsic 
relationality which permeates all coexistential forms of human objectivity. 
Fifth, taste is body-laden: all socially acquired dispositions are bodily located 
traces of quasi-naturalised conditions. Sixth, taste is power-laden: the stratifying 
tastelessness of power nourishes the categorising powerfulness of taste. The 
tasteless empowerment of the powerfully tasteful goes hand in hand with   the 
  
 
tasteless disempowerment of the powerfully tasteless. In short, the Wille zum 
Geschmack and the Wille zur Macht constitute two integral components of our 
Wille zur Welt. 
 
Bourdieu and Elias 
In the seventh chapter, Bowen Paulle, Bart van Heerikhuizen, and Mustafa 
Emirbayer discuss Bourdieu’s somewhat ambiguous relation to the oeuvre  
of one of the most influential thinkers in modern sociology: Norbert Elias. 
The chapter, succinctly entitled ‘Elias and Bourdieu’, examines both points 
of convergence and points of divergence between these two thinkers. The 
authors insist, however, that such a comparative endeavour is motivated not by 
the pursuit of intellectual speculation but by the convictions that we can gain 
fruitful insights from bringing Bourdieu and Elias closer together and that we 
can learn important lessons from cross-fertilising their approaches. Thus, as 
the authors emphasise at the beginning of their chapter, their point is not only 
to shed light on the similarities and differences between Elias and Bourdieu, 
but also, and more importantly, to demonstrate that their perspectives yield a 
more comprehensive and more powerful sociological vision when considered 
together rather than separately. 
The authors suggest that we can identify a number of reasons why the 
various affinities and commonalities between Elias and Bourdieu have not been 
a subject of debate in contemporary Anglophone sociology. First, there is the 
significant influence of diverging historical contexts: Elias’s seminal works were 
produced in the years culminating in the Second World War; all of Bourdieu’s 
influential works were produced a quarter-century after the Second World War. 
Second, there is the problem of an obvious language barrier: Elias’s main works 
were written in German, whereas most of Bourdieu’s oeuvre was written in 
French, and the English translations of their respective writings are not always 
of the most reliable quality. Third, there is the difference in sociological emphasis: 
while Elias studied long-term historical trends and developments spanning 
several centuries, Bourdieu focused on dynamics of social reproduction in 
particular historical contexts. Finally, there is the dividing question of the 
role of sociological knowledge: according to Elias, sociological knowledge is 
too specialised to have a significant use value in political matters; according 
to Bourdieu, it is the normative task of the reflexive sociologist not only to 
examine the social world but also to have a constructive and emancipatory 
impact on its development. There are multiple reasons why the idea of 
bringing the works of Elias and Bourdieu closer together is far from obvious. 
There are, however, also a number of striking affinities and commonalities 
between these two thinkers. Both were heavily influenced by continental 
  
 
sociologists such as Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, as well as by continental 
philosophers such as Husserl, Cassirer, and Heidegger. Both fought their way 
through the power-laden environment of academic institutions. And both had 
experienced and criticised the tangible consequences of social processes of 
inclusion and exclusion. Hence there are profound intellectual, biographical, 
and ideological similarities between the two thinkers. With both the differences 
and the similarities between Elias and Bourdieu in mind, the chapter explores 
key points of convergence and divergence between them by focusing on three 
concepts that feature centrally in their writings: habitus, field, and power. 
How is this conceptual triad deployed by Bourdieu? We must first remind 
ourselves that, as Bourdieu insists, the notions of habitus, field, and capital are 
to be regarded as interdependent concepts in his architecture of society. In other 
words, habitus, field, and capital constitute three societal cornerstones, which 
cannot exist independently of each other. A socially competent actor is 
equipped with a habitus, immersed in different fields, and able to acquire 
different forms of capital. Regardless of whether we look at Bourdieu’s 
earlier or later work, the ontological interdependence between these three 
cornerstones of the social is omnipresent in his writings: together, the 
dispositionally structured apparatus of the habitus, the positionally structured 
spaces of social fields, and the compositionally structured resources of 
capital form the relationally structured realm of society. 
How is this conceptual triad deployed by Elias? In Elias’s writings, habitus, 
field, and power are also conceived of as interdependent, but what meanings does 
he ascribe to these categories? The defining feature of a field, in the Eliasian 
sense, is that it describes a social space generated by relational dynamics with 
constantly shifting balances and imbalances of power. According to this view, a 
field is composed of chains or webs of interdependent actors and actions. Given 
the inescapable preponderance of relationally constructed fields in social life, 
all our actions are inevitably caught up in dynamic chains of interdependence 
and constantly shifting networks of power. One of the interesting features of 
the habitus is that its internally located and externally materialised steering 
mechanisms are the embodied manifestation of the fact that micro- and 
macro-sociological dynamics are intimately intertwined. Thus, the pervasive 
power of Elias’s famous ‘civilising process’ is expressed in its capacity to shape 
the development of society by permeating every actor’s subjectivity and 
thereby establish itself as a habitus-colonising reality. Yet, as Elias insists, the 
development of people’s habitus often lags behind the transformation of social 
structures; and this is one of the reasons why macro-societal transformations 
normally need an enormous amount of time to insert themselves in people’s 
day-to-day habits. The efficacy  of  social  power  consists  in  its  capacity 
to  assert  the  presence  of  its  powerfulness  as  a  subtle  form  of quotidian 
  
 
taken-for-grantedness. What is interesting from an Eliasian perspective, 
however, is that power is about both hierarchy and interdependence, competition 
and cooperation, subversion and compliance: not only do we all depend on 
other people, but we all depend on people who are objectively either more or 
less powerful than we are. In brief, to be immersed in social relations means to 
participate in the construction of power relations. 
On the basis of these reflections, it seems justified to suggest that the 
works of Bourdieu and Elias are not as far apart as they may appear at first 
glance and that the conceptual triad of habitus, field, and power features 
centrally in their writings.  In  order  to  illustrate  the  tangible  relevance of 
Bourdieu’s and Elias’s respective conceptual tools and sociological 
frameworks, Paulle, van Heerikhuizen,  and  Emirbayer  use  the  example 
of sport, highlighting the fact that Bourdieu and Elias were the only 
influential sociologists of the twentieth century to take sport seriously and 
to regard it as a central and indeed illuminating element of modern social 
life. The authors argue that if we look at Bourdieu’s and Elias’s respective 
approaches to sport, it becomes obvious that there is an uncanny and far-
reaching similarity between them. Above all, they share the view that sport 
can be seen as a social field in which emotional self-control and bodily self-
discipline play a particularly important role in the mobilisation of resources, 
the normalisation of  rules,  the  development  of  abilities,  and the 
competition between actors. As such, the field of sport is a social field par 
excellence, because all social fields are relationally constructed and 
normatively codified spaces of possibilities with specific modes of 
functioning and competitive struggles over power. To suggest that the field 
is in the habitus because the habitus is in the field is to assume that the game 
is in the player because the player is in the game.  The power  of social 
actors depends on their practical capacity to determine not only the 
outcome but also the rules of the game. 
 
Bourdieu and Adorno 
In the eighth chapter, Simon Susen examines the transformation of  culture  
in modern society by drawing upon the works of Pierre Bourdieu and 
Theodor W. Adorno. The chapter, entitled ‘Bourdieu and Adorno on the 
Transformation of Culture in Modern Society: Towards a Critical Theory of 
Cultural Production’, comprises four sections: the first provides some general 
reflections on the concept of culture; the second focuses on Bourdieu’s analysis 
of culture, particularly his interest in the social functioning of the ‘cultural 
economy’; the third centres on Adorno’s analysis of culture, notably his concern 
with the social power of the ‘culture industry’; and the fourth offers a comparison 
  
 
between Bourdieu and Adorno in relation to their respective accounts of the 
transformation of culture in modern society. 
(1) With regard to the concept of culture, it is important to keep in mind 
that we can distinguish at least three interrelated meanings of culture:  
culture can be used as a sociological, philosophical, and aesthetic category. As a 
sociological category, the concept of culture refers to a specific form of life 
produced and reproduced by a given group of people. As such, it describes a 
spatiotemporally contingent mode of human coexistence: just as different life 
forms produce different cultures, different cultures produce different life forms. 
As a philosophical category, the concept of culture can be conceived of as a 
human ideal. As such, it designates a civilisational achievement of advanced 
societies, whose progressive development is determined by the transcendental 
power of ‘the mind’ or ‘the spirit’ and embodied in increasingly differentiated 
social institutions: the evolution of every society depends on the education  
of its members. As an aesthetic category, the concept of culture denotes a 
distinctively human expression of artistic creativity. As such, culture is a body of 
artistic and intellectual work and the vehicle for human creativity par excellence: 
culture is both a medium and an outcome of the distinctively human capacity 
to attach meaning to the world through the expressive power of artistic and 
intellectual production. In brief, the normative, purposive, and creative 
aspects of human life are realised through the sociological, philosophical, and 
aesthetic potentials of culture. 
(2) Given the paradigmatic importance ascribed to the study of  culture   
in his writings, Bourdieu’s sociological theory can be regarded as a cultural 
theory. From a Bourdieusian perspective, there is no general theory of society 
without a general theory of culture. When examining Bourdieu’s account of 
culture in general and his analysis of the cultural economy in particular, three 
social processes are particularly important: the differentiation, commodification, 
and classification of culture. (i) The differentiation of culture in the modern 
world manifests itself most significantly in the gradual separation between 
‘the field of restricted cultural production’ and ‘the field of large-scale cultural 
production’. Whereas the former – created and legitimated by the société 
distinguée – is destined for a public of producers of distinguished cultural goods, 
the latter – reproduced and legitimated by the société massifiée – is destined for a 
public of consumers of mainstream cultural goods. (ii) The commodification 
of culture in the modern world indicates that, under capitalism, symbolic goods 
have a two-faced reality: they have both a cultural use value and an economic 
exchange value. The degree of commodification of culture reflects the degree 
of colonisation of  society by  the market. The commodification of  culture  
is problematic in that it reinforces the primacy of form over function, the 
prevalence of the mode of representation over the object of representation, the 
predominance of the signifier over the signified, and thus the preponderance of 
  
 
appearance over substance. (iii) The classification of culture in modern society 
illustrates that symbolic struggles are power struggles over the distribution of 
legitimate resources. Legitimately situated actors are legitimately classified and 
legitimately classifying actors, able to mobilise the cultural resources of their 
subjectivity, which they acquire through their positionally determined and 
dispositionally mediated exposure to society. Patterns of cultural consumption 
need to generate patterns of aesthetic perception and appreciation in order to 
produce and reproduce patterns of social legitimation. 
(3) It is difficult to overemphasise the complexity of Adorno’s analysis  
of the transformation of culture in  modern  society.  Yet,  notwithstanding 
the complexity of his account, it is obvious that if there is one concept that 
features centrally in Adorno’s social theory in general and in his cultural 
theory in particular, it is the notion of the culture industry. From an Adornian 
perspective, the rise of the culture industry is symptomatic of the changing 
nature of culture under late capitalism. Inessence, the transformation of culture 
in modern society is reflected in three social processes: the heteronomisation, 
commodification, and standardisation of culture. (i) The heteronomisation of 
culture in the modern world is reflected in the fact that culture, although it 
never ceases to be an irreplaceable ‘source of artistic creativity’, is primarily 
used as a ‘vehicle of systemic functionality’. In the totally administered world, 
which is mainly driven by instrumental rationality, culture is converted into 
an integrationist weapon of  social domination. (ii) The commodification    
of culture in the modern world is illustrated in the fact that culture, whose 
true purpose is ‘purposefulness without a purpose’, becomes degraded to an 
existence oriented towards ‘purposelessness for the purposes of the market’. 
Under late capitalism, even the most autonomous spheres of society can be 
heteronomised by the market. (iii) The standardisation of culture in the modern 
world suggests that we live in an increasingly synchronised and synchronising 
society in which the main function of culture is to serve as a ‘machine of 
reproductive sociality’, rather than as a ‘realm of transformative individuality’. 
For, under late capitalism, the culture industry succeeds in imposing its 
systemic imperatives on the whole of society, thereby forcing culture to wear 
the standardised corset of the standardising market and transforming social 
entertainment, rather than social critique, into one of the main legitimating 
pillars of the social order. 
(4) Although there are substantial differences between Bourdieusian and 
Adornian thought, the two perspectives share a number of fundamental 
assumptions about the nature and role of culture in modern society. As 
demonstrated in the final section of this chapter, the two approaches converge 
on at least five levels. (i) Given their concern with the relationship between 
culture and economy, both accounts shed light on the dynamic mechanisms 
underlying  the  commodification  of  culture  in  modern  society: advanced 
  
 
societies have developed omnipresent cultural economies and powerful 
culture industries. (ii) Determined to uncover the relationship between culture 
and domination, both accounts explore the interest-laden nature of the systemic 
functionalisation of culture in modern society: every economy of symbolic 
goods and cultural commodities is embedded in an economy of  social power. 
(ii) Drawing our attention to the relationship between culture and legitimacy, 
both accounts remind us of the stratifying pervasiveness that underpins the 
classification of culture in modern society: struggles over cultural classification 
are struggles impregnated with social patterns of  ideological legitimation. 
(iii) In light of the intimate relationship between culture and history, both 
accounts insist upon the spatiotemporal determinacy of every form of cultural 
specificity: culture is never forever. (v) Convinced that critical sociologists need 
to confront the normative task of reflecting upon the relationship between 
culture and emancipation, both accounts permit us to make sense not only of 
the disempowering consequences but also of the empowering potentials of 
the transformation of culture in modern society: emancipatory societies are 
inconceivable without emancipatory forms of culture. 
 
Bourdieu and Honneth 
In the ninth chapter, ‘The Grammar of an Ambivalence’, Mauro Basaure 
examines Bourdieu’s influence on the critical theory developed by Axel 
Honneth. Basaure’s main thesis is that Honneth’s relation to Bourdieu is 
marked by a profound ambivalence: on the one hand, Bourdieu’s work plays 
a pivotal role in Honneth’s reformulation of critical theory, particularly 
regarding the view that social struggles are a motor of historical development; 
on the other hand, Honneth is deeply critical of Bourdieu’s approach, 
accusing him of failing to account for the normative constitution of social 
life and of putting forward an overly pessimistic and essentially utilitarian 
conception of social action. In other words, while Honneth and Bourdieu 
converge in conceiving of social relations as power relations, Honneth 
criticises Bourdieu for not paying sufficient attention to the meaning-laden 
normativity that allows for the interactional functioning of society. Basaure 
proceeds in four steps: first, he presents the cornerstones of Honneth’s 
theory of the struggle for recognition; second, he aims to explain why most 
commentators tend to ignore Honneth’s sympathetic reading of Bourdieu; 
third, he analyses the impact of Bourdieusian thought on Honneth’s theory  
of recognition; and, finally, he explores the common ground between 
Honnethian and Bourdieusian thought, in particular  with  regard  to  the  
role that Honneth and Bourdieu ascribe to struggles for recognition in their 
respective approaches to the social. 
  
 
With regard to the first task, Basaure distinguishes three axes in Honneth’s 
theory of the struggle for recognition: (i) a moral-sociological explicative axis, 
(ii) a historico-philosophical reconstructive axis, and (iii) a political-sociological axis. 
The first axis reflects the conceptual effort to account for moral motivations 
behind social actions (the micro-level of intersubjective relations based on 
reciprocal recognition processes); the second axis is concerned with wider 
historical processes of moral development (the macro-level of societal relations 
based on collective learning processes); and the third axis captures the political 
nature of social struggles and the ways in which they can contribute to the 
normative construction of antagonistic collectives (the normative level of social 
relations based on contestatory processes). Central to Honneth’s theoretical 
framework is the assumption that all three axes have  a moral dimension.  
Put differently, social struggles are by definition moral struggles, for every 
struggle over the constitution of  society is concerned with the constitution  
of normativity. This is precisely where Honneth’s main critique of Bourdieu 
comes into play: he accuses Bourdieu of paying insufficient attention to the 
moral dimension of social struggles. 
With regard to the second task, Basaure argues that contemporary 
theories of social struggles are characterised by a failure to differentiate 
between two levels of analysis, namely between the ‘why’, which is crucial 
to the moral-sociological axis, and the ‘how’, which is central to the political- 
sociological axis. Basaure claims that, in Honneth’s social theory, the former 
dimension is somewhat overdeveloped, while the latter aspect remains 
largely underdeveloped. And this appears to be one of the reasons why most 
commentators tend to ignore Honneth’s sympathetic reading of Bourdieu: 
Honneth’s emphasis on the normative nature of our daily search for various 
forms of social recognition seems irreconcilable with Bourdieu’s insistence 
upon the strategic nature of our engagement in interest-laden forms of social 
action. However one tries to make sense of the relationship between these 
two positions, the Bourdieusian use of ‘superstructural’ concepts – such as 
‘interest’, ‘illusio’, and ‘doxa’ – in relation to ‘infrastructural’ concepts – 
such as ‘field’, ‘habitus’, and ‘capital’ – suggests that conflicts over social 
power are driven by struggles over social recognition. 
With regard to the third task, Basaure makes the point that, in Honneth’s 
writings, the political-sociological axis is seen as embedded in the moral- 
sociological axis. Thus, within the Honnethian framework of social analysis, 
we are confronted with the assumption that ‘the  moral’  is preponderant 
over ‘the political’: social relations are primarily conceived of as moral and 
normative, rather than as political and purposive. Central to Honneth’s 
account of struggles for social recognition (soziale Anerkennung), however, is 
the  profound  ambivalence  of  the  subject’s  dependence  on  social  esteem 
  
(soziale Wertschätzung): just as the presence of social recognition allows for the 
empowerment of individuals, the absence of social recognition leads to their 
disempowerment. Individual or collective experiences that are characterised 
by feelings of social disrespect (soziale Mißachtung) are indicative of the 
fragility of human subjectivity: the human dependence on mechanisms of 
social recognition is so strong that the possibility of individual self-realisation 
is inconceivable without people’s capacity to be integrated into society by 
establishing links based on reciprocity and intersubjectivity. Bourdieusian 
analysis is directly relevant to this moral-sociological explicative axis in that 
subjects dependent on reciprocal recognition are unavoidably interest-driven: 
we do not only depend on but we also have an interest in social recognition, 
because attainment of social esteem is a precondition for sustainable access 
to social power. Different social groups in different social fields struggle over 
different forms of social power by mobilising different resources of social 
recognition. All forms of capital – notably economic, cultural, political, 
educational, and linguistic capital – acquire social value if, and only if, they 
are convertible into at least a minimal degree of symbolic capital. The long- 
term sustainability of every field-specific form of normativity is contingent 
upon its capacity to obtain sufficient symbolic legitimacy to assert and, if 
possible, impose its general acceptability. 
With regard to the fourth and final task of his chapter, namely the attempt 
to demonstrate that Bourdieusian thought is crucial to Honneth’s sociology 
of recognition, Basaure asserts that Honneth has both a ‘broad’ and a 
‘dynamic’ conception of social struggle: in the ‘broad’ sense, social struggles 
range from clearly visible and widely recognised collective movements in the 
public sphere to largely hidden and hardly problematised forms of conflict in 
the private sphere; in the ‘dynamic’ sense, social struggles change over time, 
and so do the ways in which they are discursively represented and politically 
interpreted. If we account not only for the eclectic but also for the processual 
nature of social struggles, then we need to accept that social conflicts over 
material and symbolic power, and the ways in which individual and 
collective actors make sense or fail to make sense of these conflicts, are 
constantly changing. Thus, a comprehensive critical theory needs to do 
justice to both the multifaceted and the dynamic nature of struggles for 
recognition and thereby shed light on the various ways in which the 
existential significance of social struggles manifests itself in the constant 
competition over material and symbolic resources. 
 
Bourdieu and Religion 
In his commentary on Bourdieu’s engagement with the sociology of  
religion, Bryan S. Turner offers a comprehensive account of the strengths 
and weaknesses of Bourdieu’s approach to religion. In essence, the chapter, 
  
 
which is entitled ‘Pierre Bourdieu and the Sociology of Religion’, is concerned 
with five issues: first, the relative decline of religion in the modern world; 
second, the apparent revival of religion in the contemporary world; third, 
recent attempts to reconcile secular with religious forms of reasoning; fourth, 
Bourdieu’s account of religion; and, finally, the ‘new paradigm’ that has 
become increasingly influential in recent North American developments in 
the sociology of religion. 
With regard to the first issue, the relative decline of religion in the 
modern world, Turner points out that the secularisation thesis can be 
regarded as a central and hitherto largely unquestioned element of classical 
sociological discourse. The secularisation thesis is based on the assumption 
that secularisation processes in modern societies contain five interrelated 
tendencies: industrialisation, differentiation, privatisation, welfarisation, 
and rationalisation. (i) The industrialisation of the social system has led to 
the weakening of face-to-face ties characteristic of traditional forms of 
religiously regulated societies. (ii) The differentiation of the social system into 
various coexisting and competing spheres – such as the state, the market, 
science, art, and religion – has degraded religion to only one field amongst 
other social fields. (iii) The privatisation of the social system has contributed 
to the gradual marginalisation of religion to the domestic sphere. (iv) The 
welfarisation of the social system – that is, the provision of social welfare 
by specialised institutions – has added to a significant improvement of 
living standards and contributed to a reduction of both short-term and long-
term risks, undermining people’s dependence on belief in the uncontrollable 
power of supernatural forces over empirical reality. (v) The rationalisation 
of the social system, driven by the gradual replacement of faith and 
superstition by reason and science, has resulted in the shift from the 
‘enchanted world’ of traditional societies to the  ‘disenchanted world’ of 
modern societies. 
With regard to the second issue, the apparent revival of religion in the 
contemporary world, Turner reminds us that religion has far from disappeared 
and that, consequently, in recent years more and more sociologists and 
philosophers have concluded that religion needs to be taken seriously. Turner 
identifies some of the key developments associated with the revival of religion 
in late modern societies: the collapse of organised communism in the early 
1990s, the subsequent decline of Marxism-Leninism as a quasi-religious 
ideology of the Eastern socialist bloc, the rise of globalisation, and the 
worldwide emergence of diasporic communities. Hence, whatever lies at the 
‘heart of the heartless world’ in the contemporary context, there is substantial 
evidence to suggest that religion has not only survived the transition from 
traditional to modern society but that, in late modern society, in various parts 
of the world – particularly in America, Africa, and Asia, but also in some 
  
 
regions of continental Europe – it has expanded and gained increasing powers 
of adaptation, absorption, and transformation. 
With regard to the third issue, concerning recent attempts to reconcile 
secular with religious forms of reasoning, Turner draws upon the work of 
Jürgen Habermas, who in his recent writings has made a sustained and 
vigorous effort to demonstrate that secular and religious citizens are capable 
of living peacefully side by side and that they are, furthermore, both morally 
and practically obliged to confront the challenge of establishing a fruitful 
dialogue between reason and faith. Secularists cannot ignore, let alone 
marginalise, religious practices and beliefs if they aim to be seriously involved 
in the construction of pluralistic and multicultural societies; at the same time, 
religious citizens cannot disregard, let alone demonise, secular ways of life and 
thought if they seek to be realistically engaged in the construction of maturing 
and reason-guided societies. Notwithstanding the question of whether, in late 
modern societies, either ‘believing without belonging’ or ‘belonging without 
believing’ is the predominant form of religious reproduction, there is little 
doubt that, in postsecular societies, there can be no ‘reasoning without 
believing’ just as there can be no ‘believing without reasoning’. 
With regard to the fourth issue, Bourdieu’s account of religion, the obvious 
question to be asked is this: what, if anything, can we learn from Bourdieu’s 
account of religion? Turner’s answer to this question is, as he admits, 
somewhat paradoxical: on the one hand, it appears that Bourdieu’s analysis of 
religion, developed in his small oeuvre of essays on religion, is not particularly 
insightful and is essentially a synthesis of Max Weber’s sociological and Louis 
Althusser’s philosophical interpretations of religion; on the other hand, 
Bourdieu’s conceptual tools – such as habitus, field, and capital – do allow for 
the construction of a useful analytical framework that allows us to understand 
the sociological power of religion in terms of embodied practices, rather than 
in terms of disembodied beliefs. Turner argues that, given its functionalist 
undertones, Bourdieu’s account of religion is based on a crude combination of 
the Marxian contention that religion serves as the ‘opium of the people’ used 
to obtain ideological acceptability, the Weberian notion that religion serves as 
an ‘instrument of power struggles’ oriented towards the attainment of social 
legitimacy, and the Althusserian view that religion serves as an ‘ideological 
vehicle’ mobilised for the control of people’s subjectivity. From a Bourdieusian 
perspective, then, it is the task of a critical sociology of religion to explore the 
actual practices and interests of embodied actors situated in religious fields, rather 
than the formal beliefs and doctrines of disembodied subjects removed from those 
fields. According to this position, it is the ensemble of social relations which 
determines the ensemble of social beliefs. Despite Turner’s appreciation of 
Bourdieu’s approach to religion, he criticises Bourdieu for concentrating almost 
  
 
exclusively on field-specific positions and habitus-specific dispositions. In other 
words, he accuses Bourdieu of overestimating the reproductive mechanisms of 
social determinacy and underestimating the transformative potentials of social 
agency within religious fields. The argument is underscored by Turner’s 
disappointment with Bourdieu’s somewhat reductive reading, and partial 
misrepresentation, of Weber’s sociology of religion. 
With regard to the fifth issue, the ‘new paradigm’ prevalent in North 
American approaches to religion, the author turns his attention to a novel   
set of assumptions in the contemporary sociology of religion, epitomised by 
economic interpretations of religion. The shift from the ‘old’ European to the 
‘new’ North American paradigm reflects a move away from an emphasis on 
symbolic and ideological dimensions to an emphasis on economic and pragmatic aspects 
of religious behaviour in advanced societies. This paradigmatic shift tends to 
be undertaken by focusing on three dimensions: (i) the resilience of religion 
in late modern, including secular, societies; (ii) the various social functions of 
religious and spiritual markets; and (iii) the cross-cultural invariability of 
religiously grounded demands for meaning. It is well known that Bourdieu was 
deeply critical of social-scientific approaches based on rational action theories. 
Nevertheless, somewhat counter-intuitively Turner draws our attention to the 
fact that there are striking similarities between Bourdieu’s analysis of religious 
fields and the rational choice model of religious markets: both approaches 
move within a sociological comfort zone founded on economic concepts such 
as ‘interests’, ‘stakes’, and ‘competition’. The economy of religious fields is 
inconceivable without a politics of religious markets. Whichever paradigm 
we subscribe to, however, we cannot ignore the existence of the functional 
dialectics of belief and practice: belief can only survive if embedded in and 
nourished by practice, just as practice can only survive if situated in and 
motivated by belief. Thus, from a Bourdieusian perspective, the sociology of 
religion describes another significant area of study that permits and indeed 
compels us to conceive of the apparent antinomy between ‘the ideological’ 
and ‘the practical’ as a socio-ontological unity. 
 
Bourdieu and Habitus 
In the eleventh chapter, ‘Bourdieu’s Sociological Fiction: A Phenomenological 
Reading of Habitus’, Bruno Frère provides a detailed analysis of Bourdieu’s 
conception of  habitus. Frère points out that just as we need to be aware      
of the key strengths  of  Bourdieu’s  genetic-structuralist  approach,  we  
need to identify its main weaknesses. Hence it is possible to draw on 
Bourdieu’s approach whilst developing it further and thereby overcoming   
its most significant shortcomings. Illustrating the complexity inherent in the 
  
 
analytical task of revising Bourdieu’s genetic-structuralist approach to the 
social, Frère’s chapter focuses on five accounts of the ‘social actor’: (1) Pierre 
Bourdieu’s account of the ‘homological actor’, (2) Bernard Lahire’s account 
of the ‘plural actor’, (3) Philippe Corcuff ’s account of the ‘dynamic actor’, 
(4) Merleau-Ponty’s account of the ‘bodily actor’, and (5) Bruno Frère’s own 
account of the ‘imaginative actor’. 
(1) With regard to Bourdieu’s account of  the  ‘homological  actor’,  
Frère remarks that arguably the most influential French sociologist of the 
late twentieth century has a tendency to privilege the reproductive and 
mechanical, over the transformative and creative, dimensions of social 
action. The fact that this is a common view in the literature, not only 
amongst those who are deeply critical of Bourdieu’s work but also amongst 
those who sympathise with his approach, seems to indicate that Bourdieusian 
thought is particularly strong in terms of uncovering social mechanisms of 
reproduction and domination, but rather weak in terms of explaining social 
processes of transformation and emancipation. If, however, we are prepared 
to accept that the human proclivity towards creation and innovation as well 
as the human capacity of reflection and contemplation constitute integral 
components of ordinary social life, we are obliged to abandon a determinist 
view of the social, which fails to account for both the creative and the 
reflective potentials inherent in every ordinary subject. Although the whole 
point of Bourdieu’s project is to overcome the counterproductive antinomy 
between objectivist and subjectivist approaches in the social sciences, his 
account of the ‘homological actor’ seems to suggest that he remains trapped 
in an objectivist-determinist paradigm of social action. According to this 
homological view, the dispositional constitution of every social actor is 
largely determined by the positional constitution of social fields. 
(2) Seeking to move beyond Bourdieu’s purportedly determinist conception 
of the social, Lahire puts forward an alternative model of social action, 
epitomised in the concept of the ‘plural actor’. As Frère elucidates, Lahire’s 
alternative approach allows us to account for three key features of subjectivity 
in complex societies: multiplicity, irreducibility, and autonomy. Multiplicity 
is a constitutive component of late modern subjectivity in that the diversity 
of dispositions incorporated by social actors corresponds to the plurality of 
positions located in social fields. Irreducibility is a pivotal aspect of late modern 
subjectivity in that the coexistence of various dispositions developed by social 
actors reflects the complexity of multidimensionally structured schemes of 
perception and action. Autonomy is an empowering element of late modern 
subjectivity in that individualist societies create ‘dissonant profiles’ which 
illustrate that people’s attitudes, tastes, and practices do not necessarily 
correspond  to  one  overriding  (for  example,  socioeconomically  defined) 
  
 
disposition. In brief, unlike Bourdieu’s ‘homological actor’, conceived of   
as a largely predictable entity determined by the correspondence between 
habitus and field, Lahire’s ‘plural actor’ is an essentially unpredictable 
source of multi-causally determined agency in the fragmented landscape of 
centreless societies. 
(3) In line with Lahire’s insistence upon the multifaceted constitution of the 
‘plural actor’, Corcuff puts forward the concept of the ‘dynamic actor’. The 
most obvious feature of ‘dynamic actors’ is a ‘malleable habitus’, that is, a 
habitus capable of adjusting itself to the dynamic pace of life to which human 
actors situated in highly differentiated societies are almost inevitably exposed. 
As Frère points out, Corcuff ’s alternative perspective permits us to make sense 
of three key features of subjectivity in complex societies: reflexivity, creativity, 
and adaptability. Actors in complex societies have the potential to develop high 
degrees of reflexivity because the constant exposure to normative complexity 
requires not only the practical capacity to slip back and forth between different 
social roles played in particular social fields, but also the critical capacity to 
convert one’s performative immersion in everyday forms of human agency 
into an object of reflection when trying to cope with role conflicts generated 
by the quotidian interactions taking place in differentiated societies. Actors in 
complex societies have the potential to develop high degrees of creativity because, 
in order to realise themselves through the development of their individuality, 
they are expected to be both competent carriers and self-determined creators 
of their identity. Actors in complex societies have the potential to develop high 
degrees of adaptability because, in order to find their individual place in the 
collective spaces constructed by different communities, they need to develop 
the ability to adjust to, and function in accordance with, various coexisting 
and often competing normativities. In short, unlike Bourdieu’s ‘homological 
actor’, reducible to a largely reproductive element in a power-driven society, 
Corcuff ’s ‘dynamic actor’ is a transformative source of self-critical reflexivity, 
self-motivated creativity, and self-responsible adaptability in the fluid landscape 
of freedom-based societies. 
(4) With the aim of overcoming the explanatory limitations arising from 
the philosophical obsession with the allegedly self-determining power of   
the ‘rational actor’, Bourdieu draws upon the works of phenomenological 
thinkers, in particular the writings of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau- 
Ponty, to explore the sociological implications of the fact that every social 
actor is a ‘bodily actor’. By centring his phenomenology on the body, rather 
than on consciousness, Merleau-Ponty shifts the emphasis from the rationalist 
concern with the subject’s cognitive processing of and conscious control over 
the world to the phenomenological preoccupation with the actor’s corporeal 
immersion  in  and  unconscious absorption of the lifeworld.    Regardless 
  
 
of whether one favours an Aristotelian, a Husserlian, or a Bourdieusian 
conception of human subjectivity, one has to accept that these perspectives 
converge in acknowledging that the tangible power of the habitus stems from 
the dispositional structures which inhabit our bodies: the various positions that 
we occupy in the external world of society are worthless without the numerous 
dispositions that we carry within the internal world of our body. To accept the 
preponderance of the collective over the individual elements that inhabit our 
subjectivity, of the external over the internal facets that constitute interactional 
forms of objectivity, and of the unconscious over the conscious dimensions 
that permeate human reality means to face up to the omnipresence of society. 
Bourdieu’s aphoristic statement that ‘society is God’ essentially suggests that, as 
members of humanity, we cannot escape the ubiquity of a relationally defined 
reality (Bourdieu, 2000 [1997]: 245). Given that we, as bodily entities, are 
physically exposed to the lawfulness, power-ladenness, and interest-drivenness 
of human reality, we are obliged to develop the practical capacity to cope 
with the material and the symbolic struggles over the normative arrangements 
that shape the development of society. The bodily constitution of the habitus 
makes the social appear natural to us: we are so used to absorbing, and thereby 
accepting, the givenness of the way things are that we – as bodily entities, 
nourished by the immersive power of everyday experience – tend to recognise 
the relative arbitrariness of social reality only when confronted with the crisis- 
ladenness of established patterns of normativity. 
(5) Inspired by Bourdieu’s account of the ‘homological actor’, Lahire’s 
notion of the ‘plural actor’, Corcuff ’s interest in the ‘dynamic actor’, and 
Merleau-Ponty’s examination of the ‘bodily actor’, Frère insists that we  
need to conceive of the human subject also as an ‘imaginative actor’. With 
reference to the work of Cornelius Castoriadis, Frère introduces the idea of 
the ‘sociological fiction’ of the habitus: the imaginary institution of society  
is constantly constructed and reconstructed by the imaginary apparatus of  
the habitus. Frère’s emphasis on the ‘fictitious’ constitution of the habitus is 
aimed not at suggesting that the habitus does not actually exist, but at drawing 
our attention to the fact that the habitus, as a perceptive and projective 
apparatus, has the power to bring things into being: for us, as perceiving   
and projecting entities, the normalisation of society is  inconceivable  
without the externalising power of human subjectivity. As ‘imaginative 
actors’, we literally bring existence into being insofar as we project ourselves 
into the being of our existence. As Frère seeks to demonstrate in his own 
studies on social movements, it is by interacting with others that our need  
for expression about and working upon the world becomes a major resource 
that we need to mobilise in order to invent and reinvent our place within   the 
world.  A  sociology  that  disregards  the innovative power of imaginary 
  
 
creativity cannot account for the developmental power of socio-historical 
contingency. 
 
Bourdieu and Language 
In the twelfth chapter,  ‘Overcoming  Semiotic  Structuralism:  Language  
and Habitus in Bourdieu’, Hans-Herbert Kögler provides an intellectually 
stimulating and analytically rigorous account of an ambitious philosophical 
project: the attempt to overcome some of the key pitfalls of semiotic structuralism 
by drawing on Bourdieu’s theory of language and habitus. As illustrated in 
Kögler’s essay, there is a noteworthy affinity between the ‘linguistic turn’ in 
philosophy – associated with the works of Saussure, Heidegger, Gadamer, 
Habermas, and Searle – and the ‘reflexive turn’ in sociology – associated 
with the writings of Bourdieu. The affinity is in the following sense: both 
paradigmatic turns are motivated by the insight that human actors, insofar as 
they are unavoidably immersed in particular socio-historical contexts, cannot 
escape the preponderance of implicitly reproduced and practically mobilised 
background horizons. Background horizons are socially powerful because 
they shape people’s modes of perception, reflection, and action and, as a 
consequence, their spatiotemporally situated ways of relating to, making sense 
of, and acting upon the world. 
However one conceives of the relation between necessity and freedom, 
objectivity and subjectivity, and structure and  agency,  it  is  imperative – as 
Kögler rightly insists – to explore the empowering potentials derived from 
one species-constitutive capacity: intentional and reflexive agency. The 
question that arises from recognising that we are not only motivationally 
and intentionally driven beings, but also reflexively and critically guided 
subjects is to what extent Bourdieu’s notion of habitus allows us to account 
not only for the reproductive and habitual but also for the transformative 
and creative elements of  human action. Even if  we assume that Bourdieu  
is right to suggest that our linguistic habitus is embedded in and largely 
determined by our social habitus, it is far from clear to what extent the 
genetic-structuralist approach permits us to do justice to the relative 
autonomy of linguistically mediated forms of reflexivity. 
After setting the scene and elucidating the complexity of the theoretical 
problems arising from Bourdieu’s notion of habitus in relation to both social 
and linguistic practices, Kögler examines, in the first part of his chapter, the 
explanatory limitations of the semiotic model of communication . Drawing on Saussure’s 
semiotic structuralism, Kögler argues that every language is based on a system 
of signs, which constitutes not only a unified duality between ‘the signifier’ and 
‘the signified’  but also, more importantly, a communicative vehicle for intelligibly 
  
 
organised forms of intersubjectivity. From this perspective, a ‘diachronic’ view, 
which is primarily concerned with monological speech, needs to be replaced by 
a ‘synchronic’ view, which draws our attention to the importance of dialogical 
speech, when examining the very possibility of linguistically mediated forms of 
meaning: we need to focus on shared understandings, shared symbols, and shared 
meanings to make sense of the fact that our linguistic competence is primarily 
a social competence, that is, an interactive capacity developed through the 
constant exposure to and immersion in ordinary forms of intersubjectivity 
sustained through the linguistically mediated construction of mutual 
intelligibility. If, following Saussure’s externalist rather than internalist model, 
the construction of linguistic meaning takes place ‘between’ rather than ‘within’ 
speakers, then we need to be aware of three levels of intertwinement: first, 
the intertwinement of interpretation (know-that) and application (know-how); 
second, the intertwinement of language-as-a-structure (langue) and language- 
as-a-process (parole); and, third, the intertwinement of intelligibility (meaning) 
and normativity (values). This is precisely where Bourdieu’s work is helpful: 
from a sociological point of view, the internal organisation of a symbolic order 
is to be studied not as an autopoietic system of codes used by symmetrically 
situated subjects equipped with universally ingrained competences, but as  
an interest-laden market of signs mobilised by asymmetrically related actors 
divided by disproportionally available resources. 
With this arguably Bourdieusian framework in mind, Kögler goes on to 
draw a broad distinction between two models of linguistic meaning: the first 
approach centres on the role of validity claims; the second approach focuses 
on the role of practical dispositions. Whereas the former is closely associated 
with Habermas’s theory of universal pragmatics, the latter is particularly 
important in Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power. The main point  that 
these two approaches have in common is their emphasis on the performative 
nature of linguistic practices: speakers need to speak – that is, they need to 
use language – in order to be part of a speech community. Yet, one of the key 
points that separate these two approaches from one another is the question  
of the main function that language plays in society. According to Habermas, 
people raise validity claims as linguistic subjects who have a deep-seated 
need to attribute meaning to their daily participation in the social practices 
of their lifeworlds: society can be reproduced and transformed only through 
communicative action. According to Bourdieu, people raise legitimacy claims 
as interest-driven actors who are determined to mobilise their habitus- 
specific resources to position themselves in relation to one another when 
immersed in struggles over material and symbolic power in different social 
fields: society is reproduced and transformed through strategic competition. 
According  to  Kögler,  the  epistemological  discrepancy  between  these two 
  
 
positions is reflected in the dialectic of normative reason and practical power. Taking 
into account the respective merits of these models, a critical philosophy of 
language needs to shed light on the functional ambivalence of language: on 
the one hand, language is a vehicle for social normativity, communicative 
intelligibility, and critical reflexivity; on the other hand, language is a vehicle 
for social hierarchy, asymmetrical  relationality,  and  surreptitious  strategy. 
In short, language is both a communicative medium of rational action 
coordination and a purposive instrument of power-laden competition. 
From a Bourdieusian perspective, we are obliged to reflect on the 
relationship between language, habitus, and symbolic power. Kögler’s main 
thesis is that Bourdieu grounds the linguistic habitus in the social habitus. 
According to this view, linguistically mediated background assumptions are 
embedded in socially inculcated dispositions. Yet, the main problem with 
Bourdieu’s conception of language is that, as Kögler insists, it 
underestimates the creative and critical potentials of linguistic actors. We 
need to account for the fact that subjects capable of speech and action are 
also capable of justification and reflection. A sociological approach that 
focuses almost exclusively on the relational determinacy and resourceful 
dispositionality of social actors fails to do justice to the anthropological 
specificity of linguistically mediated forms of intersubjectivity. Our sens 
linguistique, which inhabits our sens pratique, is not only a dispositional 
conglomerate, whose existence is indicative of our socially constituted 
determinacy, but also an empowering resource, which is indispensable to the 
development of our rationally grounded sense of autonomy. 
In light of the empowering potentials inherent in rationally grounded forms 
of reflexivity, it is difficult to defend the – somewhat reductive – view that our 
linguistic habitus can be subordinated to our social habitus. The preponderance 
of social objectivity does not necessarily imply the preponderance of social 
heteronomy. As subjects capable of speech and reflection, we are able to 
develop a sense of linguistically grounded and rationally guided autonomy. 
To reduce the linguistic habitus to a mere subcategory of the social habitus 
means to treat linguistically mediated expressions of reflexivity as a peripheral 
element of exogenously determined forms of human agency. In opposition  
to this arguably ‘sociologistic’ perspective, Kögler makes a case for the view 
that there are at least three reasons why linguistically mediated forms of 
intentionality constitute an indispensable element of human agency. First, 
human beings are both goal-oriented and value-rational actors: the interdependence 
of purposive and substantive forms of rationality lies at the heart of every 
society. Second, human beings are both immersive and reflexive actors: the 
interdependence of doxic and discursive forms of rationality is fundamental 
to the daily unfolding of human performativity. Third, human beings are both 
  
 
perspectival and transperspectival actors: the interdependence of perspective-laden 
and perspective-taking forms of rationality is an indispensable moral driving 
force of human interactionality. In short, there is no ethical agency without 
linguistically mediated forms of reflexivity. 
 
Bourdieu and Politics 
The thirteenth chapter, written by Derek Robbins, is entitled ‘Social Theory 
and Politics: Aron, Bourdieu and Passeron, and the Events of May 1968’. 
Derek Robbins is an established and internationally recognised scholar in the 
field of contemporary social and political theory, and his chapter is yet another 
example of his in-depth knowledge of twentieth century intellectual thought. 
In the chapter’s first section, Robbins provides us with a brief mise-en-scène by 
which he situates Aron, Bourdieu, and Passeron in their respective intellectual 
contexts. Particularly important with regard to Aron is the fact that from an 
early stage he maintained an intellectual and methodological commitment 
to the work of Max Weber. Due to this commitment to the Weberian view 
of the world, Aron’s approach is based on the assumption that there is no 
genuine sociology of development without a critical philosophy of history, just 
as there is no professional separation between scientists and politicians without 
a conceptual distinction between objectivity and normativity. Yet, it is striking 
when reflecting on the works of Passeron and Bourdieu that, whilst both were 
philosophers by training, they became sociologists by choice. Given that both 
thinkers migrated from philosophy into sociology, Passeron and Bourdieu can 
be regarded as ‘self-exiled intellectual emigrants’, who escaped from the age- 
old discipline of philosophy, and as ‘self-invited intellectual immigrants’, who 
sought refuge in the juvenile discipline of sociology. With the motives for their 
intellectual migration from philosophy to sociology in mind, it is possible to 
understand Passeron and Bourdieu’s radical critique of the ‘scholastic gaze’, 
that is, of the illusory philosophical pursuit of intellectual purity, universal 
validity, disinterested  rationality,  and  value-neutrality.  With  their plea for 
a ‘sociological gaze’ in mind, one can make sense of their commitment to 
putting philosophy front and centre by insisting upon the socio-historical 
embeddedness of all forms of knowledge production. 
In the chapter’s second section, Robbins focuses on the work of Aron and 
proposes to examine his intellectual positions with regard to two concerns: 
the relationship between social science and political action, and the nature of 
sociology as a science. With regard to the first concern, the relationship between 
social science and political action, it comes as no surprise that Aron, as a Weberian, 
was a strong defender of the division between science and politics and, as a 
result, of a strict separation between the search for scientific validity and the 
search for political normativity. Although Aron – following Weber – regarded 
  
 
the historical nature of society as a constitutive component of human 
existence, he was opposed to historicist attempts to reduce the constitution of 
being to an evolutionary product of the hitherto-been. According to Aron, it 
is essential to preserve a notion of human freedom that allows us to recognise 
that our perceptions of the past do not necessarily shape, let alone determine, 
our actions in the future. Whatever may be one’s view on the role of history 
in general and on the role of historical consciousness in particular, it seems 
indisputable that the disenchantment of worldly existence, triggered by the 
rise of modern society, is inextricably linked to the disenchantment of worldly 
knowledge, driven by the rise of modern science. With regard to Aron’s second 
concern, the nature of sociology as a science, it is worth pointing out that – following 
Aron – there are two, fundamentally different, conceptions of sociology: one 
‘modest’ and one ‘ambitious’ conception. According to the former, sociology 
is only one amongst a series of other social-scientific disciplines; according to 
the latter, sociology is the master discipline that both stands above and exists 
through other social-scientific disciplines. As Robbins remarks, Aron clearly 
favoured the former – that is, the ‘realistic’ – over the latter – that is, the 
‘sociologistic’ – view. Thus he was concerned not to hypostatise ‘the power of 
the social’ into ‘the fetish of the social’. Even if, due to its general commitment 
to exploring the nature and development of the social world, we conceive of 
sociology as both the most wide-ranging and the most ambitious discipline in 
the social sciences, we must not assume that it therefore possesses the epistemic 
monopoly over the systematic study of the functioning of society. 
In  the  chapter’s  third  section,  Robbins  sheds  light  on  the  – arguably 
‘Aronian’ – nature of the research carried out by Bourdieu and Passeron in 
the 1960s. Profoundly disillusioned with the French higher education system 
and deeply critical of the exclusionary aspects of the presumably inclusionary 
French democracy,  Bourdieu and Passeron developed a research agenda aimed  
at examining the underlying logic of both pedagogical and political relations 
in France and the ways in which they contributed to the actual reproduction, 
rather than the potential transformation, of established power relations. In 
essence, these studies demonstrated that in modern France the relative elasticity 
and stability of social domination was due to the interwovenness of symbolic and 
material, habitual and institutional, informal and formal, and cultural and 
economic resources of power. Yet, as Robbins insists, there were also some 
striking differences between Bourdieu and Passeron in terms of their respective 
approaches to the social. Bourdieu had a tendency to concentrate on the 
heteronomous, and thus ultimately reproductive, logic of field-dependent 
discourses, field-specific systems, and field-embedded institutions; conversely, 
Passeron was prepared to acknowledge the autonomous, and hence potentially 
transformative, logic of pluralised discourses, differentiated systems, and 
diversified institutions. Despite this not insignificant point of divergence derived 
  
 
from a normative discrepancy between different sociological presuppositions, 
Bourdieu and Passeron were united in their epistemologically inspired and 
methodologically justified ambition to overcome what they conceived of    
as artificial and counterproductive dichotomies: the oppositions between 
positivist and hermeneutic, naturalist and anti-naturalist, and empiricist and 
interpretivist approaches in the social sciences. Questioning the legitimacy of 
widely accepted antinomies in intellectual thought, Bourdieu and Passeron 
established themselves as two practising social scientists who, whilst sharing an 
educational background in philosophy, ended up developing an interest and 
expertise in sociology, particularly in the sociology of education and culture. 
As Robbins emphasises, their academic itineraries had been heavily influenced 
by Aron, notably by his practical engagement with politics and his intellectual 
interest in political science. 
Finally, Robbins reminds us that, following in Aron’s footsteps, Passeron 
and Bourdieu were politically engaged. They tried to link their commitment 
to politics with their commitment to science, and hence they sought to show 
both in their writings and in their actions that even if, in a classical Weberian 
fashion, one attempts to separate  politics  and  science,  the  two  spheres  
are inextricably interrelated. Practical questions concerning the political 
organisation of society cannot be separated from theoretical questions arising 
from the scientific study of society. Where both Bourdieu and Passeron clearly 
differed from Aron, however, was in their sustained efforts to bring to light the 
extent to which processes of pedagogical communication euphemised, and 
hence reproduced, mechanisms of political domination. More importantly, 
they differed from Aron in their radical, rather than conservative, beliefs in 
the liberating potentials of counter-cultures and counter-politics aimed at 
undermining the established doxa of  the cultural and political mainstream  
of French society. From this perspective, a raisonnement sociologique can only 
have a constructive impact on society insofar as it conceives of itself as a 
raisonnement politique. 
 
Bourdieu and the Public Sphere 
In the fourteenth chapter, ‘Intellectual Critique and the Public Sphere: 
Between the Corporatism of the Universal and the Realpolitik of Reason’, 
Yves Sintomer discusses Bourdieu’s account of the nature of scientific and 
intellectual thought. If, following Bourdieu, we conceive of critical sociology 
as a systematic attempt to uncover the underlying mechanisms that determine 
both the constitution and the evolution of the social world and if, furthermore, 
we consider this task to be a normative endeavour aimed at shedding light on 
both  different sources of social domination and different resources of human 
  
 
emancipation, then the production of scientific knowledge is not an end in itself 
but an empowering tool that enables us to have a transformative impact on 
the world. Insisting on both the descriptive and the normative dimensions that 
permeate scientific and intellectual thought, Sintomer provides an insightful 
account of Bourdieu’s sociology of reason, that is, of the systematic attempt to 
examine the social conditions underlying the rationally grounded production 
of knowledge. In essence, Sintomer’s chapter offers a critical analysis of five 
types of reason: (1) intellectual reason, (2) scientific reason, (3) political reason, 
(4) critical reason, and (5) communicative reason. 
(1) Reflecting upon the nature of intellectual reason, Sintomer identifies 
different denotative and connotative meanings of the word ‘intellectual’. 
First, in the broadest sense, it can be used to refer to knowledgeable and 
cultured people, who are equipped with the necessary educational capital to 
immerse themselves in intellectual fields and thereby develop an intellectual 
habitus. Second, in a more restricted sense, the term is used to distinguish 
‘skilled labour’ from ‘manual labour’, suggesting that the former is primarily 
cerebral whereas the latter is mainly physical in nature. Third, in an even 
narrower sense, the term can be employed to characterise professional 
academics and artists, for whom reflexivity and creativity constitute the sine 
qua non of their everyday existence. Finally, in an even more confined – and 
arguably Bourdieusian – sense, the term can be used to designate those people 
who have the symbolically, and often institutionally, conferred authority to 
participate in one of the three cultural fields par excellence – scientific, artistic, 
or literary – and defend their cultural legitimacy through the affirmation of 
their symbolic authority in the public realms of society. As Sintomer points 
out, it is this last meaning which is particularly important in making sense   
of the multifaceted ways in which the cultural field possesses the paradoxical 
capacity to convert its dependence on publicity into a privilege of collective 
privacy: in order to be part of a distinguished cultural group, one needs to 
master the distinguished cultural codes that allow one to relate to, and be 
recognised within, a distinguished cultural field. 
(2) Examining the nature of scientific reason, Sintomer reminds us that one 
of the most remarkable achievements of the scientific field has always been its 
capacity to affirm its relative autonomy in relation to other powerful realms 
of society. If the lasting success of the scientific field manifests itself in its 
relative independence from other social fields, then the pervasive influence of 
scientific reason is expressed in its epistemic ability to distinguish itself from 
other forms of social rationality. Thus, the power of scientific reason is not 
only due to its – endogenously developed – explanatory capacity but also due 
to its – exogenously recognised – epistemic autonomy: in order for scientific 
rationality to be a source of enlightening knowledgeability it constantly needs 
  
 
to affirm and demonstrate its relative independence from other – notably 
political, economic, and religious – forms of rationality. In Bourdieusian 
terms, the scientific game can be characterised as a ‘corporatism of the 
universal’ because it is based on the collectively negotiated search for universal 
truths. Nonetheless, in order to avoid the trap of epistemic transcendentalism 
or epistemic relativism, it is necessary to recognise both the historical 
embeddedness and the emancipatory progressiveness of scientific reason: just 
as particular life forms produce particular language games, particular language 
games produce particular life forms. The functional interdependence of 
scientifically motivated forms of rationality and scientifically shaped forms of 
society reflects the fruitful interplay between reason-guided language games 
and reason-guided life forms. 
(3) Exploring the nature of political reason, Sintomer – following Bourdieu – 
puts forward the idea that the ‘production of truth’ can be conceived of as a 
‘politics of truth’: given the social embeddedness of all knowledge claims and 
given the interest-ladenness of all social conditions, we cannot deny the intrinsic 
normativity that inhabits the most rigorously argued claims to epistemic validity 
and scientific objectivity. The ‘Realpolitik of reason’, as Bourdieu calls it, is only 
sustainable insofar as it is guided by the ‘Realvernunft of politics’, for a commitment 
to critical rationalism is worth nothing without a commitment to ethical 
pragmatism. As Sintomer – drawing on Bourdieu – insists, the ‘corporatism of the 
universal’ and the ‘Realpolitik of reason’ are closely interrelated, for the scientific 
quest for defensible truth claims and the political quest for justifiable rightness 
claims are two integral components of the civilisational search for universally 
acceptable legitimacy claims. The politics of universal values, however, needs 
to face up to the interest-laden nature of all forms of normativity in order to 
recognise its own socio-historical determinacy. 
(4) Exploring the nature of critical reason, Sintomer frames his analysis in 
terms of  the relationship between the ‘corporatism of  the universal’ and  
the ‘public sphere’, that is, in light of the emancipatory potentials inherent  
in all forms of rationality that are exposed to public scrutiny. By definition, 
the aforementioned types of reason – intellectual, scientific, and political – 
represent critical forms of reason. Yet, what are the constitutive features of 
such critical forms of reason? Inspired by Bourdieu’s sociological critique of 
scholastic notions of reason in general and by his relentless attack on Kantian 
and Habermasian forms of abstract rationalism in particular, Sintomer brings 
five essential features of critical reason to our attention. First, critical reason 
is aware of its own historicity: a critical analysis of reason needs to examine the 
socio-historical contingency of all forms of rationality. Second, critical reason is 
capable of acknowledging its own partiality: a critical analysis of reason needs to 
explore the interest-laden normativity of all forms of rationality. Third, critical 
  
 
reason does not hide away from its own determinacy: a critical analysis of reason 
needs to face up to the field-specific referentiality of all forms of rationality. 
Fourth, critical reason is prepared to put its own existence into perspective by 
recognising the enlightening power of epistemic plurality: a critical analysis of 
reason needs to accept the presuppositional elasticity underlying all forms of 
rationality. Finally, critical reason is inconceivable without a sustained reflection 
upon its own contestability: a critical analysis of reason needs to uncover the 
power-laden negotiability of all forms of rationality. In short, critical reason, 
in the Bourdieusian sense, demands the awareness of the social conditioning 
underlying all forms of action and reflection. 
(5) In a Habermasian spirit, Sintomer offers critical reflections on 
Bourdieu’s account of knowledge production, insisting on the emancipatory 
potentials inherent in social processes oriented towards mutual understanding, 
epitomised in what we may refer to as communicative reason. Despite the 
aforementioned strengths of the reflexive-sociological approach to knowledge 
production, Bourdieu’s account of reason essentially suffers from three 
serious shortcomings: determinism, scientism, and fatalism. Bourdieu’s tendency 
to conceive of rationality in terms of its field-immanent determinacy prevents 
him from accounting for the field-transcendent autonomy of both ordinary 
and scientific claims to epistemic validity: epistemic validity is partly, but not 
exclusively, determined by its field-specific legitimacy. Bourdieu’s tendency 
to conceive of rationality in terms of a duality between mundane and 
methodical knowledgeability is based on the scientistic assumption that critical 
reflexivity represents a socio-professional privilege of intellectuals and experts, 
rather than a socio-ontological privilege of the human species. Yet, ordinary 
subjects capable of speech and action are also capable of reflection and 
action. Bourdieu’s tendency to conceive of rationality in terms of strategic, 
rather than communicative, action is symptomatic of his fatalistic view of the 
social. A one-sided focus on the monological and purposive elements of social 
action oriented towards power and competition, however, proves incapable  
of doing justice to the emancipatory potentials inherent in the dialogical and 
communicative elements of social action oriented towards discussion and 
cooperation. In brief, a ‘Realpolitik of reason’ should not only seek to recognise 
but also aim to realise the ‘Realpotential of reason’. 
 
Bourdieu and Time 
In the final chapter, ‘Practice as Temporalisation: Bourdieu and Economic 
Crisis’, Lisa Adkins assesses the relevance of Bourdieu’s work to economic 
sociology in general and to the sociology of time in particular. Specifically, she 
asks to what extent Bourdieu’s social theory can be a useful tool to make sense 
  
 
of the recent and ongoing global economic crisis. It is Adkins’s contention that 
in Bourdieu’s work we can find powerful resources to study economic crisis 
from a sociological perspective, but that the conceptual and methodological 
tools borrowed from a Bourdieusian framework need to be modified and 
refined to exploit their explanatory power in relation to the social and political 
analysis of contemporary issues. 
Adkins identifies five main reasons why Bourdieu’s work is not commonly 
used to analyse economic crises. (i) Despite his exploration of different types of 
capital – notably social, cultural, symbolic, and economic capital – nowhere in 
Bourdieu’s writings can we find an attempt, however rudimentary, to elucidate 
the specificity of capitalist capital. (ii) Even though he insists upon the temporal 
constitution of the social world in general and of social fields in particular, 
Bourdieu does not examine the process of abstraction and quantification of 
labour into temporally structured units. Insofar as he fails to consider that 
under capitalism labour can be converted into exchangeable equivalents, 
Bourdieu does not account for the specificity of capitalist labour appropriation. (iii) 
While he is concerned with social processes of domination and exploitation, 
Bourdieu does not explore the social implications of the  conversion  of 
living labour into abstract labour (let alone of living into abstract forms of 
capital), which is central to the very functioning of capitalism as a social 
system; thus, he fails to do justice to the specificity of capitalist abstraction. (iv) 
Notwithstanding his general interest in the sociological significance of field- 
specific forms of crisis, usually triggered by a confrontation between orthodox 
and heterodox discourses as well as between dominant and dominated groups 
in a given social field, Bourdieu does not provide a set of explanatory tools 
capable of aiding our understanding of the specificity of capitalist crisis. (v) In 
spite of Bourdieu’s emphasis on the dialectical nature of reproductive and 
transformative processes of social structuration, it is generally assumed that, 
within his theoretical framework of ‘generic structuralism’, the reproductive 
power of stasis remains prevalent over the transformative potential of crisis 
and that, as a consequence, Bourdieu’s approach does not account for the 
specificity of capitalist transformation. 
Adkins goes on to assert that, despite the aforementioned shortcomings, 
Bourdieu offers a number of conceptual resources that permit us to make 
sense of recent economic events, not only in terms of a crisis of time but also in 
terms of a restructuring of time. Drawing on Richard Sennett’s critical account of 
the corrosive effects of late capitalism, she reminds us that the accumulation 
of flexibilised – that is, fragmented – experiences and the cultivation of weak – 
that is, opportunistic – ties in the post-Fordist economy have contributed     
to the construction of a world in which people find it increasingly difficult  
to  develop  a  sense  of  narrative  movement.  Under  the  heading  ‘Trading 
  
 
the Future?’, Adkins remarks that the post-Fordist universe is a world 
characterised by the radical renegotiation of temporal horizons. In a world 
dictated by the powerful dynamics of permanent scientific innovation, 
compulsive large-sale technologisation, and macro-societal transformation, 
the temporal boundaries between past, present, and future are constantly 
being reshaped and resignified towards emphases on situational contingency, 
historical indeterminacy, and societal uncertainty. Consequently, the 
looking-forwardness of the human condition is absorbed into the taken-for- 
grantedness of the post-Fordist condition. 
This is where Bourdieu is helpful. Under the heading ‘Anticipation: Time in 
the Making’, Adkins discusses a Husserlian theme in Bourdieu’s writings on time: 
according to Bourdieu, the future is always already existent in the immediate 
present, for human agents are ordinarily immersed in the forthcoming. Since 
human agents are equipped with predispositional schemes of perception and 
appreciation, which anticipate their positionally situated course of action, in the 
social world the always-still-to-be is part of the always-already-been just as the 
always-already-been is part of the always-still-to-be. In short, it is the protensive 
nature of practice which explains the extensive nature of the present. Human 
agents are condemned to anticipate the forthcoming within the world because 
they are obliged to impose their structured and structuring resources upon the 
world. The ineluctable preponderance of the predispositionally constituted 
and prereflexively executed nature of human agency is indicative of the 
protensive constitution of social temporality. The objective potentials that  
are always already inscribed in a given social field, constitute the background 
horizon of the subjective potentials that are still to be realised by a given 
social agent. To the extent that the espace de possibles is always a temps de possibles, 
the possibles d’un espace are always the possibles du temps: every spatially defined 
horizon of possibilities is also a temporally defined horizon of possibilities, and 
every possibility arising from a given social space is also a possibility emerging 
from a given social time. In other words, what is possible through a given 
human action is contingent upon the spatiotemporally constituted horizon of 
possibilities prescribed by a given social field. 
If, as Adkins points out, we accept that the forthcoming is always already 
inscribed in the present, we have to be prepared to confront at least four issues: 
first, the injunction to anticipate may be an idiosyncratic feature of our present 
moment (the socio-historical structuration of time); second, to the degree that the 
forthcoming is capable of undercutting or destabilising the present, the former 
is preponderant over the latter (the future-laden orientation of time); third, given 
our simultaneous immersion in the temporal horizons of past, present, and 
future, we should conceive of human practices as being situated in a temporal 
continuum (the fluid constitution of time);  and, fourth,  rather  than  simply assuming 
  
 
that time makes practice, we also need to recognise that practice makes time 
(the praxeological production of time). 
In the section entitled ‘Time is Money’, Adkins stresses the sociological 
importance  of  one  of  the  underlying  principles  of   the  capitalist  economy: 
to be able to do things faster and more efficiently than one’s competitors is a 
precondition for increasing the profitability of one’s business. The hegemonic 
mode of production, then, is also a hegemonic mode of temporalisation: rates of 
profit and production depend on profit-oriented and production-driven forms of 
temporalisation. The entanglement of economic practice with time obliges us, as 
critical sociologists, to reflect upon the ways in which societies are not only spatially 
but also temporally structured. Every mode of production requires a particular 
mode of temporalisation. The key issue when exploring the structuration of time 
in capitalist society is that, under the rule of clock time, social phenomena and 
social time are separated and hence – to use Adkins’s formulation – in clock time 
events do not make time but take place in time. Rather than human practices determining 
time, time determines human practices. 
In the section entitled ‘Money is Time’, Adkins examines the paradigmatic 
transformation of time in late modern societies. The slogan ‘time is money’ 
captures a central normative imperative of Fordist regimes of production:  
the more rapid and the more efficient, the more productive and the more 
profitable. By contrast, the slogan ‘money is time’ sums up a key normative 
imperative of post-Fordist regimes of production: the stronger and richer 
financially, the more flexible and powerful socially. Whereas under industrial 
capitalism time is money, in deregulated financial markets money has become 
time. Given that in the post-Fordist context, which is dictated by the pressing 
imperatives of the financial markets, time has ceased to operate as an external 
vessel for practice and has become increasingly merged with events, time 
itself  has become a pivotal driving force of  economic empowerment: in   
the post-Fordist world, the production of society is increasingly contingent 
upon the temporalisation of production. The question remains, however, to 
what extent the restructuration and resignification of time in the post-Fordist 
world have created a situation in which the experience of social life has 
become more abstract than in previous societies. If we now live in a world 
reproduced and kept alive through the collective experience of unexperienced 
experiences, then – as Adkins pertinently remarks – the participation in social 
life is potentially beyond meaning and interpretation. A society in which the 
control of time escapes the control of ordinary people is a society in which 
the search for meaning is increasingly shaped by the purposive power of 
systemic reproduction, rather than by the communicative power of everyday 
interaction. We certainly do not live in a timeless society, but we may live in a 
society without time. 
  
Conclusion 
From a range of authors and from a variety of perspectives, the chapters of 
this book provide a comprehensive and critical evaluation of the sociology  
of Pierre Bourdieu. Although they raise many difficult problems concerning 
Bourdieu’s legacy, they illustrate the power and scope of his sociology in 
shaping our understanding of modern society, especially with regard to the 
sociological significance of field-specific struggles over various forms of power 
and different resources. It is obvious that Bourdieu borrowed extensively and 
openly from the writings of classical sociologists, notably from the works of 
Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. Yet, he also created a battery of concepts – 
such as ‘field’, ‘habitus’, and ‘capital’ – which have profoundly influenced, 
and will continue to stimulate, contemporary social and political analysis. 
These diverse contributions demonstrate the enduring importance of classical 
sociology, while recognising the creative and innovative energy that derives 
from Bourdieu’s thought. 
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